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COURT SHOWS VOTING RIGHTS ACT CONTRADICTIONS
By Linda P. Campbell
Tribune correspondent Steve Daley contributed to this report.
Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune
July 4, 1993
The Supreme Court's ruling last week on the
constitutionality of race-based redistricting
underscores the conflicts that have dogged the Voting
Rights Act since its inception - and probably
exacerbated them.
Trying to make sense of it, people who consider
themselves fair-minded have asked questions such as:
If everybody gets a chance to vote, why should
minorities get special treatment?
If I am a white voter put into a district that has
been designed to be predominantly black or Hispanic,
isn't my vote diminished when I can no longer help
elect a white candidate?
If the Voting Rights Act tells legislators to take
race into account during redistricting, how can the
court now say they can't do that without striking
down the act itself?
Despite Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's idealistic
goal of "a political system in which race no longer
matters," as she wrote in the North Carolina case
Shaw vs. Reno, race continues to pervade voting in
this country. Were that not so, a Voting Rights Act
would be unnecessary.
That hard-fought piece of legislation was adopted
in 1965 in recognition that nearly a century after the
15th Amendment guaranteed all Americans the right
to vote, lawmakers in some parts of the country
continued to frustrate its promise.
Congress realized that the whites, who traditionally
held power, particularly in Deep South states, were
reluctant to share it with blacks. They had moved
away from poll taxes and intelligence tests, but still
found other ways to discourage minorities from
voting or to prevent them from winning elections.
Amendments passed in 1982 took into account a
subtler bias: totally arbitrary drawing of voting
districts still could keep large minority populations
from ever influencing elections by scattering them in
a way that perpetuated white political dominance.
As might be expected, liberals consider the Voting
Rights Act a powerful tool for increasing minorities'
political participation, while conservative critics see
it as another example of government overreaching to
bestow unfair racial preferences.
For good or ill, the use of districts encompassing
large minority populations has become the key
method of enforcing the act.
The theory behind this is that when groups of
people can be shown to vote in blocs according to
their race, minorities have the best chance of electing
the candidates of their choice if they are aligned in
districts where they constitute more than 50 percent
of the voting-age population.
Certainly, majority minority districts, as they are
known in legal parlance, are not universally popular
even among supporters of the Voting Rights Act.
For example, University of Pennsylvania law
professor Lani Guinier, President Clinton's
withdrawn choice to head the Justice Department's
civil rights division, has criticized them - and been
blasted herself for proposing alternatives to their use.
Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) recently complained that
when such districts are overpacked with minorities,
majority white districts are left with only a negligible
number of minorities whose "interests get pushed to
the margins."
Breaux said the U.S. House district he represented
for 14 years was about 25 percent minority, similar
to the statewide racial mix. "When you start out with
25 percent minorities in your district, there isn't any
question you have to weigh the interests of all those
folks," he said.
In 1977 the Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution does not prevent states from taking race
into account in drawing voting districts. The court's
opinion was written by Justice Byron White, who
retired last week. He often sided with conservative
colleagues on other issues, but favored giving broad
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latitude to ensure that everyone has an equal chance
to participate in the political process.
But last week, the 5-4 majority led by O'Connor
seemed to be saying to those who are drawing
boundaries - for congressional districts, city council
wards, whatever - that you can consider race but not
too much and not so obviously that you create a
district that looks like an inkblot on a Rorschach test.
A snake-like majority black district in North
Carolina was too much for the court. And it said that
when map drawers appear to lump minorities together
simply because they share a common race or
ethnicity, there had better be a "compelling interest"
to justify that handiwork.
Although the Constitution requires only that voting
districts have roughly equivalent populations, not that
they be compact and contiguous, at least five justices
consider appearances important.
The North Carolina case, brought by white voters,
was based on the Constitution's equal protection
guarantees, but the legislators who were sued thought
they were drawing the offending district to avoid a
Voting Rights Act lawsuit by the U.S. Justice
Department.
"There is a real conflict between the way the court
talked about race-conscious districting (in the latest
ruling) and what always has been meant by the
Voting Rights Act when it talks about it," said
American University law professor Binny Miller,
who litigated voting rights cases in the Reagan Justice
Department.
"The way the Voting Rights Act has been
interpreted . . . is to make sure that minority voters
have a way of . . . voting together to elect to office
people of their choosing."
The harshest critics of the act contend that it
perpetuates racial stereotypes - notions that whites
always vote together, blacks always vote alike, that
a person only represents interests of people of the
same race, etc.
But that is not quite how it works.
For instance, in order to force an at-large system
to adopt single-member districts or a remap of a
system already employing districts, a minority group
would have to prove in court that voting patterns
show white voters always vote in blocs to defeat
black candidates or candidates of any race supported
by the majority of black voters.
In a 1986 ruling that upheld the constitutionality of
the 1982 amendments to the Voting Right Act, the
Supreme Court set up a three-part test. A jurisdiction
violates the act if black voters tend to vote along
racial lines; whites vote along racial lines to defeat
candidates favored by blacks; and the jurisdiction
could draw districts to enable blacks to elect their
candidates but has not done so.
In the North Carolina case, White and the three
justices who joined him in dissent argued that white
voters could not complain that they were shut out of
the political process when whites as a group still
constitute a voting majority in 10 of the state's 12
congressional districts.
The individual whites who challenged the remap
may dispute that logic. Nevertheless, it reflects the
difficult policy choice Congress made with the Voting
Rights Act.
As Miller put it: "Is it better to have some white
voters in black districts with no influence . . . or is
it better to have a whole class of people who have no
influence across the board?
"What the Voting Rights Act says is it's the lesser
of two evils."
Linda P. Campbell covers the Supreme Court for
the Tribune
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JUSTICES PLAN TO DELVE ANEW INTO RACE AND VOTING RIGHTS
By LINDA GREENHOUSE, Special to The New York Times
Copyright 1993 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
July 11, 1993
The Supreme Court's contested ruling last month
in a North Carolina redistricting case, far from being
the Justices' last word on voting rights, may prove to
be only one step in a prolonged and searching review
by the Court of the role of race in electoral politics.
Three voting rights cases, two from Florida and
one from Georgia, are already on the agenda for the
Court's next term, which begins in October. The new
cases give the Justices the opportunity, which some
appear eager to take, to deal with sensitive and
unresolved issues concerning the application of the
Voting Rights Act.
Among the questions the cases pose are these:
To what degree should voting rights be seen as
group rights? If a racial or ethnic minority group has
the numbers to make up a majority in an additional
legislative district, must that district be created? How
are legislatures and courts to sort out competing, if
not mutually exclusive, claims in a highly charged,
multi-ethnic setting like South Florida?
To what extent does the right of equal participation
at the polls incorporate a right to electoral success? If
a minority group whose members register and vote in
sizeable numbers is still not big enough to have a
voice within a local government's traditional
structure, does the Voting Rights Act require the
structure to be changed?
Does a minority group's achievement of electoral
success, in proportion to its share of the population,
effectively bar that group from suing under the
Voting Rights Act for greater representation? If so,
what is the proper framework for assessing
proportionality: the local area? the whole state? And
what population should be counted in the equation?
The voting-age population, as is usually the case? Or
the population of citizens who are eligible to vote, a
definition that could substantially undercut the claims
of Hispanic groups to a right to greater
representation?
Challenging the Foundation
The Supreme Court alluded to some of these
issues but did not discuss them directly when it ruled
on June 26, in Shaw v. Reno, that an oddly shaped
district drawn by the North Carolina Legislature for
the purpose of sending a black representative to
Congress may have violated the constitutional rights
of white voters who were displeased to find
themselves in a majority-black district.
Unsettling as that 5-to-4 decision was to those who
had interpreted the Court's precedents as precluding
lawsuits by whites in such circumstances, the new
cases could potentially have an even broader impact.
Open for the Court's consideration is not only the
fate of those districts whose bizarre shapes might
evoke "the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the
past," as the majority described North Carolina's
12th Congressional District, but also the philosophical
underpinnings of the Voting Rights Act itself.
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and
significantly amended it in 1982 to respond to a
Supreme Court decision that interpreted the law's
central provision as barring only intentional
discrimination against minority voting rights. The
1982 amendment made it clear that Congress was
concerned not only with intent but also with results,
barring any voting practice or procedure that resulted
in members of minority groups having "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."
How Far to Go?
But melding the concept of equal opportunity with
a focus on results has built into the amended Voting
Rights Act an inherent contradiction that the Court
has yet to sort out. Which is the act's real promise:
opportunity or outcome?
Of the cases now before the Court, the one from
Georgia displays that tension most starkly. The case
is from Bleckley County, which, like 14 other small
counties, all in Georgia, has an unusual form of
government, a single commissioner who combines all
executive and legislative functions. While 20 percent
of the county's 10,400 people are black, and while
blacks register to vote at the same 70 percent rate as
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whites, no black person has ever been elected
commissioner or has any realistic prospect of being
elected.
The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit, in Atlanta, ruled last year that the
single-member commission violated the Voting Rights
Act by diluting the ability of the black population to
elect representatives of its choice. The appeals court's
proposed remedy, which it ordered the Federal
District Court to consider, was to increase the size of
the county commission to five members, to be elected
from districts.
Jackie Holder, the incumbent County
Commissioner, appealed to the Supreme Court. Last
winter, while the Justices were considering whether
to hear the case, Holder v. Hall, No. 91-2012, the
Bush Administration filed a brief asserting that the
appeals court's analysis was wrong. "It is inherent in
the very nature of our majoritarian democratic
political system that numerical minorities lose
elections," the brief said, warning that the appeals
court's approach could bring single-member positions
like governor, mayor or state attorney general under
Voting Rights Act scrutiny.
By the time the Court took the case on March 1,
the Clinton Administration -was in office and
informed the Justices of a new position. The notion
that the failure of a small minority group to achieve
success at the polls cannot indicate a Voting Rights
Act violation is at odds with the theory of the act, the
Government's new brief told the Court. A challenge
to a government structure cannot be dismissed simply
on the basis of a minority group's small size if an
alternative structure exists, the brief said.
In their brief, however, lawyers for Mr. Holder
argue that the Voting Rights Act "is not intended to
insure that numerical minorities win elections" and
does not state that "electoral success is the measure
of equal opportunity to participate."
Choosing Between Groups
The Florida cases now before the Court raise
another set of basic policy questions under the act. In
one case, a three-judge Federal District Court found
that the Florida Legislature violated the Voting Rights
Act in its redistricting of seven State Senate seats in
the Dade County area after the 1990 census. The
court found that both the Hispanic and black
populations were sufficiently numerous, compact and
politically cohesive to merit an additional seat apiece
- a fourth for Hispanic residents and a third for
black residents.
But it refused to order a change, declaring that one
group's representation could be enhanced only at the
expense of the other; the court found it preferable to
leave both groups shortchanged rather than choose
between them. On the surface, this case, DeGrandy
v. Johnson, No. 92-593, presents a rather narrow
procedural question: can a Federal court, once having
identified a Voting Rights Act violation, decline to
provide a remedy?
But the Justices may find it hard to resist dealing
with the underlying issue of whether the District
Court properly found liability in the first place, either
in this case or in the companion case that presents the
question more directly. In the second case, the same
three-judge court found that the state reapportionment
plan for the Florida House of Representatives violated
the Voting Rights Act by drawing only 9 out of 20
Dade County districts with Hispanic majorities when
the Hispanic population was big enough to provide
majorities in 11 districts.
The state, appealing this ruling in Johnson v.
DeGrandy, No. 92-519, is arguing that the
distribution of State House seats in Dade County
reflects almost exactly the proportion of the
population that is white, black and Hispanic. In
finding that this was not good enough, the state says,
the District Court adopted the view that minority
voting strength must be enhanced to the maximum
extent possible - a principle that the state says the
Voting Rights Act itself does not contain.
Fully reflecting Florida's highly competitive and
contentious ethnic mix, these cases might well
increase the Supreme Court's concern that districts
drawn primarily for reasons of race "may Balkanize
us into competing racial factions," as Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor said in her majority opinion last
month.
In the Florida State Senate case, the N.A.A.C.P.
filed a brief urging the Court to accommodate the
interests of both black and Hispanic voters. But if
that cannot be done, the brief said, "the advantage
should be given to the historically most disadvantaged
of the two groups, which in this case was the
African-American group."
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91-2012 HOLDER v. HALL
Voting Rights Act-Single county commissioner
form of government-Evidence.
Ruling below (CA 11, 955 F2d 1563):
Determination of whether single commissioner
form of county government violates Section 2 of
Voting Rights Act should be based on totality of
circumstances, which involves consideration of
wide variety of factors, and is not limited to
electoral evidence; however, before challenged
procedure will be found to violate Section 2, there
must be evidence that bloc-voting majority must
usually be able to defeat candidates supported by
politically cohesive, geographically insular minor-
ity group; violation of Section 2 was established
by evidence of all three necessary preconditions:
(i) that county's black electorate is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute
majority in single-member district if single dis-
tricts were created out of presently existing
countywide district, (ii) that black voters are
cohesive minority, and (iii) that white voters, who
constitute 80 percent of county's electorate, vote
sufficiently as bloc to enable them, absent special
circumstances, to usually defeat candidates pre-
ferred by county's black voters; accordingly, dis-
trict court decision that there was no Section 2
violation is reversed and case is remanded for
imposition of remedy.
Question presented: Did court of appeals err in
holding that governance by single county commis-
sioner, rather than multi-member board of com-
missioners, is subject to challenge as dilutive
under Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, as amend-
ed, 42 USC 1973?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/16/92, by R.
Napier Murphy, and Martin, Snow, Grant &
Napier, both of Macon, Ga., John C. Daniel Ill,
and W. Lonnie Barlow.
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92-519 JOHNSON v. DE GRANDY
Redistricting of state legislature-Voting Rights
Act.
Ruling below (DC NFla, 7/17/92):
Remedy for claim that state senate redistrict-
ing plan, which created three districts with His-
panic supermajorities in each district's voting age
population and two districts with black VAP
majorities (out of total of 40 districts), violatedSection 2 of Voting Rights Act by failing to
create fourth Hispanic district, and remedy for
claim that such plan violated Section 2 by failing
to create third black district, are mutually exclu-
sive; plan adopted by Florida legislature, which
creates three Hispanic districts and two black
districts, is compromise that properly balances
competing minority interests in south Florida
even though it violates Section 2; in any event,
there is another senate district in south Florida
that is black "influence" district, in which black
VAP is 35.5 percent, that functions as third black
district in south Florida without adversely affect-
ing Hispanic minority, because Hispanic commu-
nities are characterized by large number of non-
citizens and lower voter registration rates,
supermajority of VAP is necessary in order to
create districts in which Hispanics can elect can-
didates of their choice, redistricting plan for Flor-
ida's house of representatives, which creates nine
(out of 20) districts in Dade County with Hispan-
ic supermajorities of VAP and four black major-
ity districts. dilutes Hispanic votes in violation of
Section 2 of Voting Rights Act: therefore, dis-
tricts suggested by De Grandy plan, which cre-
ates II Hispanic districts and four black districts
and minimizes "ripple efect" on surrounding
districts caused by redrawing district lines, best
remedies dilution of Hispanic vote in south Flor-
ida while advancing interests of blacks in south
Florida.
Questions presented: (1) Does state-enacted
reapportionment plan violate Section 2 of Voting
Rights Act, because it does not maximize elector-
al opportunities of class of minority plaintiffs,
notwithstanding that plan provides minority class
with opportunity to elect representatives in num-
bers at least equal to class's proportion of popula-
tion? (2) When determining minority voting
strength under test of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986), may plaintiffs case rest on esti-
mates of voting age population that include sub-
stantial numbers of non-citizens who are ineligi-
ble to vote, or must plaintiff demonstrate voting
strength on basis -of. eligible voters, at least when
defendant has demonstrated that substantial per-
centage of plaintiff class are not citizens? (3)
May federal court impose reapportionment plan
as remedy for Voting Rights Act violation with-
out affording state any opportunity to devise
acceptable remedial plan, especially when court-
ordered plan unnecessarily trenches on funda-
mental state policy choices? (4) Do core princi-
pies of comity and federalism require federal
court to abstain from adjudicating Vting.Righw
Act claims when plaintiffs seeking federal court
relief have previously raised, and demanded and
received adjudication of, identical claims in on-
going state court proceeding?
Appeal filed 9/22/92, by Jonathan B. Sallet,
Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Scott A. Sinder, and Jen-
ner & Block. all of Washington, D.C., Richard E.
Doran, George L. Waas, and Gerald B. Curing-
ton. Fla. Asst. Attys. Gen.. and Kevin X. Crow-
Icy, James A. Peters, and Cobb, Cole & Bell, all
of Tallahassee, Fla.
92-593 DE GRANDY v. JOHNSON
Redistricting of state legislatue-Voting Rights
Act.
Ruling below (DC NFla. 7/17/92):
Remedy for claim that state senate redistrict-
ing plan, which created three districts with His-
panic supermajorities in each district's voting age
population and two districts with black VAP
majorities (out of total of 40 districts), violated
Section 2 of Voting Rights Act by failing to
create fourth Hispanic district, and remedy for
claim that such plan violated Section 2 by failing
to create third black district, are mutually exclu-
sive; plan adopted by Florida legislature, which
creates three Hispanic districts and two black
districts. is compromise that properly balances
competing minority interests in south Florida
even though it violates Section 2- in any event,
there is another senate district in south Eorsia
that is black "influence" district, in which black
VAP is 35.5 percent, that functions as third black
district in south Florida without adversely affect-
ing Hispanic minority- because Hispanic commu-
nities are characterized by large number of non-
citizens and lower voter registration rates,
supermajority of VAP is necessary in order to
create districts in which Hispanics can elect can-
didates of their choice: redistricting plan for Flor-
ida's house of representatives, which creates nine
(out of 20) districts in Dade County with Hispan-
ic supermajorities of VAP and four black major.
ity districts, dilutes Hispanic votes in violation of
Section 2 of Voting Rights Act; therefore, dis-
tricts suggested by De Grandy plan, which cre-
ates 11 Hispanic districts and four black districts
and minimizes "ripple effect" on surrounding
districts caused by redrawing district lines, best
remedies dilution of Hispanic vote in south Flor-
ida while advancing interests of blacks in south
Florida.
Questions presented. (1) Upon finding of viola-
tion of Section 2 of Voting Rights Act, can
district court decline to provide for complete
remedy of that violation? (2) Upon establishing
liability under Section 2 of Voting Rights Act,
what remedial procedure and standards should
district court employ to insure that Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment guarantees are not
eviscerated by deference to state redistricting
policies?
Appeal filed 9/29/92. by C. Allen Foster,
Robert N. Hunter Jr., Marshall R. Hurley, and
Patton, Boggs & Blow, all of Greensboro, N.C.,
Alberto R. Cardenas and Ferrell. Cardenas, Fer-
tel & Morales, both of Miami, Fla., and E. Thom
Rumberger. George N. Meros Jr., Daniel J.
Gerber, and Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, all of
Tallahassee. Fla.
92-767 US. v. FLORIDA
Redistricting of state saste-Violation of Voting
Rights Act-Remedy.
Ruling below (De Grandy v. Wetheril,
DC NFla. 7/17/92):
Remedy for claim that state senate redistrict-
ing plan, which created three districts with His-
panic supermajorities in each district's voting age
population and two districts with black VAP
majorities (out of total of 40 districts), violated
Section 2 of Voting Rights Act by failing to
create fourth Hispanic district, and remedy for
claim that such plan violated Section 2 by failing
to create third black district, are mutually exclu-
sive; plan adopted by Florida legislature, which
creates three Hispanic districts and two black
districts, is compromise that properly balances
competing minority interests in south Florida
: mthuh it violates Section 2, in any event,
there is another senate district in south Florida
that is black -influence" district, in which black
VAP is 35.5 percent, that functions as third black
district in south Florida without adversely affect-
ing Hispanic minority; because Hispanic commu-
nities are characterized by large number of non-
citizens and lower voter registration rates,
supermajority of VAP is necessary in order to
create districts in which Hispanics can elect can-
didates of their choice.
Questions presented- (1) Did district court
abuse its discretion when it refused to conduct
remedial proceedings concerning possibility of
providing complete relief for Section 2 violations
it had found, and instead summarily adopted as
permanent remedy very plan it had found violat-
ed Section 2? (2) Did district court abuse its
discretion in failing to provide complete relief to
Hispanic voters for Section 2 violations because
doing so might result in loss of African-American
"influence" district?
Appeal filed 10/29/92, by Kenneth W. Starr.
Sol. Gen.. John R. Dunne. Asst. Atty. Gen.. John U
G. Roberts Jr., Dpty. Sol. Gen., James P. Turner,
Dpty. Asst. Atty. Gen.. James A. Feldman, Asst.
to Sol. Gen. and Jessica Dunsay Silver and
Irving Gornstein, Justice Dept. Attys.
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DE GRANDY v. WETHERELL
Nos. TCA 92-40015-WS, TCA 92-40131-WS and TCA 92-40220-WS.
United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.
July 17, 1992.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Florida currently has forty Senate districts and one
hundred twenty House of Representative districts.
These districts were created in 1982 and are currently
malapportioned. According to the 1990 census data,
the total population of the state of Florida is
12,937,926 persons. Between the census of 1980 and
1990, Florida's population increased 3,213,602
persons. To achieve equality between Florida's forty
Senate districts, each district would ideally contain
323,448 persons. To achieve equality between
Florida's one hundred twenty House districts, each
district would ideally contain 107,816 persons.
On the opening day of the 1992 Florida legislative
session, Miguel De Grandy, a member of the Florida
House of Representatives, and other registered voters
("De Grandy plaintiffs") filed a complaint against the
Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, the
President of the Florida Senate, the Governor of
Florida, and other state officials. The De Grandy
plaintiffs filed the complaint in this court challenging
the constitutionalityof Florida's current congressional
and state legislative districts. The De Grandy
plaintiffs alleged that the current districts violate both
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, and urged this court to assert jurisdiction in
order to redistrict and reapportion the state.
On March 9, 1992, the De Grandy plaintiffs filed
a second amended complaint alleging violations of
Article I, Section 2 and of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution as well as violations of Sections 2 and 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42
U.S.C. s 1973 et seq.
In short, Count I alleged that the present Florida
House and Senate districts were unconstitutional
inasmuch as they violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 2 of
the United States Constitution and the "one-person,
one-vote" principle. Count II alleged that because
these districts diluted the voting strength of minority
voters, they violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended. Count III alleged that the Florida
Legislature was at an impasse in adoption of state
redistricting plans. Counts V and VI alleged that the
time lines for redistricting set forth in Article Ill,
Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, in conjunction
with the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, "permit the adoption and
implementation of new district lines to take place so
late in the year after the decennial census" that they
result in a deprivation of plaintiffs' right to
participate in the 1992 elections on a fair and equal
basis.' Count V alleged a facial challenge, while
Count VI alleged an "as applied" challenge. Count
VII alleged that certain defendants have "intentionally
misused the time lines and procedures found in
Article III ... to delay the redistricting process to the
advantage of white incumbents and to the detriment
of voters and would be challengers to those
incumbents." On March 13, 1992, the Florida
legislature ended its regular session without adopting
a state reapportionment plan.
On April 7, 1992, the court consolidated this case
with a similar lawsuit filed by the Florida State
Conference of the NAACP Branches and many
individual African-American voters. On April 17,
1992, the Attorney General of the State of Florida
submitted Senate Joint Resolution 2-G concerning
state legislative reapportionment to the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance
pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. That
same day, this court issued an order bifurcating the
congressional redistricting and state reapportionment
hearings.
On May 13, 1992, the Florida Supreme Court
validated Senate Joint Resolution 2-G. [T]he court
granted the government's motion to be dismissed as
a party to the litigation, but invited comments from
J. Gerald Hebert of the United States DOJ.
On June 16, 1992, the DOJ issued its preclearance
decision, noting that its review and determination
addressed the plans only insofar as the five
preclearance counties were affected. The Attorney
General of the United States did not interpose any
objection to the Florida House of Representatives
redistricting plan. The DOJ refused to preclear the
Senate plan stating: We are unable to reach the same
conclusion with regard to the Senate redistricting
plan. With regard to the Hillsborough County area,
the state has chosen to draw its senatorial districts
such that there are no districts in which minority
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persons constitute a majority of the voting age
population. To accomplish this result, the state chose
to divide the politically cohesive minority populations
in the Tampa and St. Petersburg areas. Alternative
plans were presented to the legislature uniting the
Tampa and St. Petersburg minority populations in
order to provide minority voters an effective
opportunity to elect their preferred candidate to the
State Senate.... [The information before us,
including the economic and other ties between Tampa
and St. Petersburg, as well as the political
cohesiveness of minority voters in those two cities,
demonstrates that the two areas do share a
commonality of interest. Finally, we have examined
evidence, including evidence in the legislative record,
which suggests that the state's approach to senatorial
redistricting in the Hillsborough area was undertaken
with an intent to protect incumbents. Such a
rationale, of course, cannot justify the treatment of
minority voters in this area by the State Senate plan.
Jurisdictional questions were raised both in this
court and in the Florida Supreme Court. The De
Grandy plaintiffs filed their action in this court on
January 14, 1992, and have continually asserted that
jurisdiction to correct the Department's Section 5
objection lies only in this court. The Florida
Supreme Court, however, without discussing the
propriety of concurrent federal jurisdiction, held that
mhe reapportionment of state legislative bodies is
not a power delegated by the Constitution of the
United States to the federal government. Under the
provisions of the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, this is a power reserved to states.
Of course, this Court is obligated to apply any
applicable federal constitutional provisions and any
federal statutes implementing these provisions. The
Florida Constitution places upon this Court the
responsibility to review state legislative
reapportionment. Art. III, s 16, Fla. Const.
Pursuant to that authority, we approved the original
legislative reapportionment and retained jurisdiction
to entertain subsequent objections thereto. Consistent
with the provisions of article III, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution, we believe that it is our
obligation to redraw the plan to satisfy the objection
of the Justice Department now that the Legislature
has declared that it is not going to do so. In re
Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G,
Special Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So.2d 543,
545 (Fla. 1992). Defendants have consistently
maintained that because Article III, Section 16 of the
Florida Constitution specifically conferred jurisdiction
over legislative redistricting to the Florida Supreme
Court, this court should abstain in deference to the
principles of comity and federalism. This court has
declined the invitation to abstain.
On June 25, 1992, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted a Senate redistricting plan which it felt
complied with the DOJ's objection to Hillsborough
County. After reviewing the six submitted plans, the
Supreme Court adopted the plan submitted by Gwen
Humphrey, et al., and supported by Representative
Darryl Reaves, et al. ["Humphrey-Reaves plan"].
Constitutionalityof SJR-2G, 601 So.2d at 546. Chief
Justice Shaw wrote separately to indicate his opinion
that the overall plan-including the present
revision-does not comply with Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act: Because this Court's review in the
present proceeding is limited in scope to DOJ's
section 5 preclearance inquiry, I concur in the
majority opinion. I believe the present revision in the
plan meets the objection evinced in DOJ's admittedly
restricted review. I write to note, however, that I
still conclude that the overall plan, including the
present revision, fails under Section 2 of the Act
because it does not provide an equal opportunity for
minorities to elect representatives of their choice to
the Florida legislature, as noted in my earlier dissent.
Constitutionality of SJR-2G, 601 So.2d at 548 (Shaw,
C.J. specially concurring).
The focus of this litigation has continually shifted.
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleged that the
delay inherent in Article III, Section 16 of the Florida
Constitution (and the fact that the legislature was not
expected to pass a reapportionment plan in time for
the scheduled 1992 elections) resulted in an
unconstitutional intrusion in a citizen's right to vote.
When the legislature passed SJR 2-G, plaintiffs
asserted that this plan would not be precleared by the
DOJ, and then when the Senate plan was, indeed, not
precleared, plaintiffs asked this court to adopt a plan
which complied with Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.
On June 23, 1992, the DOJ filed in this court its
own lawsuit' against the State of Florida and several
elected officials alleging that (1) the redistricting
plans for the members of the Florida Legislature
dilute the voting strength of African-American and
Hispanic citizens in several areas of the state in
violation of Section 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. s 1973, et seq. and (2) the state's
proposed Senate plan in the Hillsborough County area
divides the politically cohesive minority populations
in the Tampa and St. Petersburg areas such that there
are no senatorial districts in which minority persons
constitute a majority of the voting age population.3
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The De Grandy plaintiffs were also permitted to
amend their complaint to allege Section 2 violations
in both the House and Senate plans. On June 26,
1992, this court commenced its hearing on legislative
reapportionment. At the outset, the court ruled on
several pending motions and heard argument on the
others. After argument, the court granted Alberto R.
Cardenas' and Alan K. Fertel's Motions for Leave to
Appear Pro Hac Vice and the United States' Motion
to Consolidate its lawsuit into the pending litigation.
The court then turned to the Florida Senate
redistricting plan.
The DOJ indicated its belief that the Florida
Supreme Court's modification to the Hillsborough
County area Senate districts satisfied its previous
objection. The Department stated that a preclearance
decision would be made within days of the State's
submission of the plan to the Department. The same
day, this court imposed the Florida Supreme Court
plan as its own plan for section 5 purposes. The
effect of this was to eliminate the need for
preclearance. "Plans imposed by court order are not
subject to the [preclearance] requirements of s 5."
At the same time, however, the court indicated its
intention to entertain Section 2 challenges on both the
Florida Senate and Florida House plans."
In Count VIII of the De Grandy plaintiffs' fourth
amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that both the
Florida House and Senate redistricting plans
encompassed in joint resolution of legislative
reapportionment, SJR 2-G, violate Section 2 et seq.
of the Voting Rights Act, Title 42, United States
Code, Section 1973, et seq. Specifically, plaintiffs
contend that "[t]he joint resolution of apportionment
... unlawfully fragments cohesive minority
communities and otherwise impermissibly submerges
their right to vote and to participate in the electoral
process." Plaintiffs attack both the Dade County
districts in the Senate plan and the Dade and
Escambia County districts in the House plan as
violative of Section 2, alleging that
The African-American population in Escambia
County was split into two districts, one of 30% black
population and one of 14% black population. SJR 2-
G deliberately fractures Escambia County's
African-American population in order to protect
white, incumbent representative, Speaker-designate
Bo Johnson. Alternative plans encapsulate the black
population in a relatively compact, cohesive, 40%
black community of interest.
* * * * * *
In Dade County, black citizens were fragmented in
District 118 and District 119. Many African-
American seats were also packed with many Hispanic
citizens which dilutes the ability of African-
Americans to elect candidates of choice.
* * * * * *
Hispanic voters are packed in Districts 110
(82.1%), 111 (75.7%), and 114 (77.5%) and further
submerges Hispanic voters in black minority districts,
specifically, District 103 (62% black, 27.8%
Hispanic), District 109 (63.0% black, 34.5%
Hispanic), and District 118 (34.5% black, 27.1%
Hispanic). Less egregious examples of packing, but
still having the same dilutionary effect, are District
104 (57.8% black, 16.1% Hispanic), Anglo District
105 (19.2% Hispanic), Anglo District 106 (32.3%
Hispanic), District 108 (66.2% black, 16.0%
Hispanic). SJR 2-G appears to purposefully pack,
fracture and submerge Hispanic population
deliberately to dilute Hispanic voting strength; Nine
Hispanic-American majority districts were created in
SJR 2-G; however, other plans submitted to the
Legislature show that eleven majority Hispanic-
American seats can be created in the Dade County
area. This dilution of Hispanic voting strength is
accomplished by - the aforementioned packing,
fracturing, and submergence with the intent and
purpose of protecting white incumbents;
With respect to the plan for apportionment for the
Florida State Senate, ... the redistricting plan enacted
by the State of Florida creates 7 Senate districts in
the Dade County area. The state's plan fragments
the Hispanic population concentrations such that
Hispanics comprise a majority of the voting age
population only in three districts. The racial and
ethnic population concentrations existing in the Dade
County area are such that, if the Dade County area of
the state is divided into equally populated legislative
districts which respect communities of interest and
followother non-discriminatoryplan-drawing criteria,
Hispanics would constitute a significant voting age
majority of the population in one additional Senate
district in Dade County. The complaint also alleges
that the creation of these districts was both intentional
and willful, and for the purpose of preserving white
incumbent legislators and discriminating against
African-American and Hispanic candidates and
electorate.
The entire trial lasted five days-from Friday, June
26, 1992 through Wednesday, July 1, 1992,
excluding Sunday, June 28, 1992. The court first
heard testimony concerning the Senate Plan. At the
close of plaintiffs' case in chief, defendants orally
moved for a directed verdict, which was denied by
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the court. The Senate defendants then presented their
case. The court next turned to the attack upon the
Dade County portion of the House plan.
The parties advised the court that they were
attempting to settle the Escambia portion of the
lawsuit by redrawing the Escambia County House
districts. After hearing the testimony of one of
plaintiffs' Escambia County witnesses, the court ruled
from the bench that the "plaintiffs [had] established a
prima facie case on the constitutional violation in the
Escambia County area of Florida." Before the close
of plaintiffs' prima facie case, the court was notified
that the parties, except for plaintiff-intervenor Darryl
Reaves, had reached a settlement agreement as to the
Escambia County House districts. Upon the granting
of the House defendants' oral motion to dismiss
Reaves for lack of standing as to Escambia County,.
the court considered and approved the proposed
consent judgment.
On July 1, 1992, at the close of all testimony and
oral argument, the court ruled from the bench that
the plaintiffs have shown a fourth Hispanic district
can be drawn in accordance with the [Thornburg v.
] Gingles [478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d
25] standard, but the plaintiffs' have failed to prove
that a fourth Hispanic district can be drawn without
creating a regressive effect upon Afro-American
voters in Dade County and South Florida....
Consequently, under Supreme Court precedent, this
court must give deference to the state policy as
expressed in the Florida plan as validated by the
Florida Supreme Court.
After hearing closing argument as to the Dade
County portion of the Florida House plan, the court
ruled from the bench that "under the totality of the
circumstances, the plaintiffs have shown a violation
of Section 2 in that the plaintiffs have shown that
more than nine Hispanic districts may be drawn
without having or creating a regressive effect upon
black voters in South Florida and in Dade County."
The court indicated its intention to immediately
proceed into the remedy phase of this case. The
court later imposed the Modified De Grandy Plan as
its own plan. On July 2, 1992, the court entered
judgment as to the 1992 Florida Senate Plan and as
to the 1992 Florida House Plan, the latter
supplemented on July 6, 1992. Following the trial,
the House and Executive defendants moved for
reconsideration. These motions were denied. The
House defendants also moved for reconsideration,
rehearing and for a stay the court denied.
This opinion memorializes and explains the court's
rationale for its July 2, 1992 rulings.
II. FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW7
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
As amended and in pertinent part, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides as follows: (a)
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in
subsection (b). (b) A violation of subsection (a) is
established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the state or
political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one
"circumstance' which may be considered, provided
that nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C.
s 1973.
As originally passed, Congress intended for the
language of Section 2 to parallel the language of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Because Section 2 parallelled
the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality of the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff was required to
prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of
Section 2. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62, 71, 100 S.Ct. at
1497, 1502. In response to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Bolden, Congress amended Section 2 in
1982 to include a "results" or "effects" test to
determine whether racial vote dilution has occurred.
In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct.
2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), the Supreme Court
received its first opportunity to review the 1982
Section 2 amendments. Gingles involved a Section 2
challenge to the use of multi-member districts in
North Carolina. The Court held that "[tihe essence
of a Section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and
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historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to
elect their preferred representatives." Gingles, 478
U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2765. Additionally, the law
is clear that Section 2 extends coverage to "language
minorities" including Hispanics.
In determining whether a Section 2 violation
has occurred, "a court must assess the impact of the
contested structure or practice on minority electoral
opportunities 'on the basis of objective factors.' "
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2763 (quoting
Senate Report at 27). The Supreme Court in Gingles
reiterated the list of "typical" factors which may be
relevant to, and probative of, a Section 2 claim as set
forth in the Senate Report. These "Senate factors"
include: 1. The extent of any history of official
discrimination in the state or political subdivision that
touched the right of the members of the minority
group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate
in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which
voting in the election of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to
which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process,
whether the members of the minority group have
been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to
which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination
in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process; 6. whether political campaigns
have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the
minority group have been elected to public office in
the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases
have had probative value as part of plaintiffs'
evidence to establish a violation are: Whether there is
a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group. And whether the
policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
This list is not exhaustive-it is not required that
any number of the factors be proved and other factors
may be relevant. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct.
at 2763. The Court did note, however, that "the
most important Senate Report factors bearing on
Section 2 challenges to multi-member districts are the
'extent to which minority group members have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction' and the
'extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized.' " Gingles,
478 U.S. at 49 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-66 n. 15
(quoting U.S.C.C.A.N.1982 at 206).
The Court, however, set forth the following
important limitations on the extent to which these
factors establish liability under Section 2: [W]hile
many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report
may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through
submergence in multimember districts, unless there is
a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use
of multimember districts generally will not impede
the ability of minority voters to elect representatives
of their choice. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. at
2765.
The Court then listed three circumstances which
"are necessary preconditions for multi-member
districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability
to elect representatives of their choice." Gingles,
478 U.S. at 49-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. These
preconditions are: 1) the minority group must be able
to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single member district; 2) the minority group must be
able to show that it is politically cohesive 3) the
minority group must be able to demonstrate that the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as
the minority candidate running unopposed-usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
The purpose of the first requirement is to
determine whether "minority voters [would] possess
the potential to elect representatives in the absence of
the challenged structure or practice." Gingles, 478
U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17. As the
Gingles court noted, because a minority population
which is spread evenly throughout the district "cannot
maintain that they would have been able to elect
representatives of their choice in the absence of the
multimember electoral structure," they cannot
maintain that the multimember electoral system itself
dilutes the voting strength of the minority voters.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n.
17.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not spoken as to
whether the Gingles analysis applies when a court is
faced with a challenge to single member districts.
District courts are divided on this issue [some]
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holding that the Gingles preconditions do not apply to
a single-member district plan, and [some] holding
that they do. We find the approach taken by Hastert
and DeBaca to be persuasive and accordingly turn to
examining the Gingles factors.
Of course, the effect of proving these three
preconditions is an open question in this circuit. In
Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012
(11th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1023, 111 S.Ct. 670, 112 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991) this
circuit divided 5-5 as to the legal effect of proving
the three Gingles factors. Because we find a Section
2 violation under either Judge Kravitch's or Judge
Tjoflat's approach, the court need not address the
conflict raised in Solomon. In other words, this
court concludes that the plaintiffs have satisfied each
of the three elements Gingles requires and that when
considered together with the Senate factors, the
"totality of the circumstances" show that with respect
to Florida's Senate Plan, Hispanic and African-
American vote dilution exists in Dade County in
violation of s 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Additionally, under the totality of the circumstances,
Hispanic vote dilution exists in Dade County under
Florida's House Plan.
B. Application of the Gingles Factors
1. Sufficiently Large and Geographically Compact
a. Sufficiently Large (Citizenship)
The Gingles court stated that in order to state a
claim under Section 2, the minority group must show
that it is sufficiently large to constitute a majority in
a single member district. There is some dispute as to
whether the term "majority" as used in Gingles refers
to a numerical majority or a voting majority, and
therefore, whether a court should focus on voting age
population or total population as the measure of
opportunity within a given district. Although the
Burton court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held in
Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763,
774-76 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028,
111 S.Ct. 681, 112 L.Ed.2d 673 (1991) that total
population may be an adequate measure of minority
opportunity, it followed the holdings of both
McDaniel and McNeil v. Springfield Park District,
851 F.2d 937, 944-45 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 1769, 104 L.Ed.2d 204
(1989) and concluded that "political opportunity is
best measured in terms of minority voting age
population." Burton, 793 F.Supp. at 1354.
This court has previously indicated its view that the
VAP is the relevant inquiry as concerns redistricting,
and we adopt the rationale and conclusion of the
Burton court that voting age population (VAP) rather
than total population provides a better measure of
opportunity within a given district to elect a candidate
of choice. Creating districts containing a bare
majority VAP of minority groups such as
African-Americans and Hispanics, however, will not
necessarily remedy a Voting Rights Act violation
because, even if minorities constitute fifty percent of
the overall population or voting age population in a
district, they may not make up fifty percent of the
voters. The court found in Ketchum that "minorities
must have something more than a mere majority even
of voting age population in order to have a reasonable
opportunity to elect a representative of their choice."
Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1413. According to the
experts, there are four key reasons why a
supermajority of minority VAP is necessary to create
effective minority districts:
(a) there are typically more aliens among minority
(especially Hispanic) populations; (b) the voting age
population is typically a lower proportion of the total
population among minorities; (c) registration rates
are often lower among minorities; and (d) turnout
rates are often lower among minorities.
An Hispanic supermajority of the VAP is necessary
to account for the fact that many Hispanics are
noncitizens and have lower voter registration rates.
This fact is not disputed by any party and is
confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Moreno: "[tihe
nature of tripartite politics in Dade means that only
when Hispanics have a supermajority can a Latin
candidate win." Affidavit of Dr. Dario Moreno
Because the issues in this case were whether a fourth
majority Hispanic Senate district and whether a tenth
and eleventh majority Hispanic House district could
be drawn in Dade County, much of the testimony
revolved around what constituted a "supermajority"
of Hispanic VAP sufficient to enable Hispanics to
elect a candidate of their choice.
Much of the testimony addressed the "65 percent
rule" and the impact of citizenship on the voting age
population. The 65 percent rule states that "barring
exceptional circumstances, a district should contain a
black [or Hispanic] population of at least 65 per cent
(or a voting age population of at least 60 percent) to
provide blacks [or Hispanics] with an opportunity to
elect a candidate of their choice." Brace, supra at
44. The origin of this rule has been traced to the
United States Supreme Court case of United Jewish
152
Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct.
996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) and has been
subsequently addressed in Ketchum and Neal v.
Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. 1426 (E.D.Va.1988).
According to Kimball Brace, the foundation of the
rule is suspect: Legend has it that the rule came about
because someone in the Justice Department took 50
percent and simply added 5 percent to compensate for
the higher proportion of Hispanic noncitizens, 5
percent for lower Hispanic voting age population
(VAP) and 5 percent for lower Hispanic registration
and turnout. Brace, supra, at 44.
In his testimony before the court in Ketchum, 740
F.2d at 1415, Mr. Brace stated the rule in a slightly
different way: [The 65 percent rule] is derived from
the 50 percent total population, adding five percent
for each of the three factors that are voting age
population, because minorities tend to have a lower
voting age population, lower registration patterns and
a lower turnout pattern. Whereas in Clinton and
Ketchum, Mr. Brace would supplement the 50
percent majority figure by five percent each for low
voter registration and low voter turnout (for a total of
ten percent), in his law review article, he would
supplement the 50 percent majority figure by five
percent total for low registration and turnout.
For this and other reasons, the 65 percent rule is
not universally accepted by.experts and has been
modified or rejected by some courts. The court in
Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp.
1147, 1149 (N.D.Ill.1983) stated that:
The 65% figure is a general guideline which has
been used by the DOJ reapportionment experts and
the courts as a measure of the minority population in
a district needed for minority voters to have a
meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice. The 65% guideline, which the Supreme
Court characterized as "reasonable" in [Carey], takes
into account the younger median population age and
the lower voter registration and turnout of minority
citizens. The court in Coleburn noted that mhe
general 65% guideline for remedial districts is not a
required minimum which the plaintiffs must meet
before they can be awarded any relief under s 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. Rather, the 65% standard is
a flexible and practical guideline to consider in
fashioning relief for a s 2 violation. Coleburn, 689
F.Supp. at 1438. The Coleburn court noted that the
65% figure is an "approximation of the type of
corrective super-majority that may be needed in any
particular case" which may have to be "reconsidered
and adjusted in light of 'new information' and
changing circumstances." Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at
1438 (citing Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1416 nn. 20, 21).
In his affidavit, Dr. Arrington indicates why he
and other experts have modified the 65% rule insofar
as it affects African-Americans: [B]ecause minority
communities are now better organized and minority
citizens more likely to register and vote than was true
in an earlier era [,i]t is not always necessary to have
a 60% [African-American VAP district] to assure
blacks the opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice. Although a 60% black VAP is probably still
a good goal, 55% black VAP is almost always
enough for black citizens to have an opportunity to
participate in the political process and elect candidates
of their choice. Affidavit II of Dr. Arrington (exhibit
to document 474). The court in Ketchum similarly
concluded that a 65% supermajority of
African-American VAP might no longer be necessary
to ensure African-Americans a chance to elect a
candidate of their choice and advised district courts to
reconsider that figure in light of new information and
statistical data: For example, we note that the Rev.
Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential candidacy has
apparently stimulated black registration and turnout
nationally. More specific to Chicago, we understand
that the November 1982 gubernatorial election in
Illinois and the 1983 Chicago mayoral election
indicated a marked increase in black registration and
turnout. If these and other elections should
demonstrate a significant and consistent change in
voting behavior in Chicago applicable to aldermanic
elections, there would have to be a corresponding
change in redistricting practices and legal standards[.]
Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1416 n. 21. The testimony in
this case also showed that African-Americans turn out
in much higher rates than Hispanics.
The effectiveness of the African-American majority
districts created by the Florida House and Senate
plans is not in dispute. The African-American VAP
in these districts ranged from 50.96% to 57.24% in
the House districts and from 51.7% to 52.5% in the
Senate and no party has attempted to argue that these
districts would not result in an African-American
candidate of choice being elected.' Thus we find that
a district with an African-American majority VAP is
an effective district which gives African-Americans a
potential for electing candidates of their choice.
Accordingly, the NAACP's proposed three
African-American districts satisfy the "sufficiently
large" requirement. The only question, therefore, is
whether the VAP in the proposed one additional
Hispanic Senate district and two additional Hispanic
House districts would enable Hispanic voters in these
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districts to elect candidates of choice without
impairing the VAPs in the surrounding 3 Hispanic
Senate and 9 Hispanic House districts.
Plaintiffs' own witness testified that an Hispanic
Senate district containing 55% Hispanic VAP would
be "problematic" inasmuch as the VAP would be too
low to guarantee that the district would result in the
election of the Hispanic candidate of choice.
Plaintiffs submitted evidence, however, that a district
containing 59 percent Hispanic VAP would enable
Hispanics to elect a candidate of choice."
Specifically, Dr. Lichtman testified that
Once the Hispanic concentration reaches a certain
point, then all those districts seem to elect Hispanics,
but below that given point, none of the districts seem
to elect Hispanics.... [N]o candidate of choice of the
Hispanic ... has been elected in districts below a 59
percent Hispanic level, and in districts at 59 percent
and above, those districts have in every instance
elected Hispanic candidates. Dr. Lichtman concluded
that the Hispanic VAP of 62.1 percent in district 40
provided Hispanics a "realistic opportunity" to elect
a candidate of choice in that district.'o Dr.
Lichtman's assessment included adjusting for the
lower Hispanic voter turnout. Although Dr. Lichtman
had previously recommended to the Dade County
commission that they attempt to create "rock solid"
majority Hispanic districts containing 65% Hispanic
VAP and "rock solid" majority African-American
districts containing 55% African- American VAP,
these districts were created "for an entirely different
purpose" and he "erred on the side of making sure
that [these] seats would be safe." He then reaffirmed
his conclusion that "a 62 percent district, while not
an absolute lock ... certainly comes well within the
range to provide Hispanic voters a realistic potential
to elect candidates of their choice."
Defendants, on the other hand, submitted evidence
that after accounting for the lower level of citizenship
for Hispanics, some of the newly created Hispanic
districts would not be effective. In other words,
although the Hispanic VAP might indicate that these
districts would tend to elect a Hispanic candidate of
choice, because the number of Hispanic citizens (as
opposed to voting age residents) did not constitute a
majority, Hispanics would not be able to elect a
candidate of choice without relying on a certain
percentage of white-crossover votes. According to
defendants, the creation of these two additional
Hispanic districts would do nothing more than dilute
the Hispanic citizen VAP in the remaining nine
districts and would result in a decrease in safe
Hispanic districts.
In support of their argument, defendants cite De
Grove's testimony that after adjusting for citizenship,
a district containing 66% Hispanic VAP would have
less than 50% Hispanic voters." Defendants further
note that citizenship levels vary among Hispanic
districts-older, settled Hispanic neighborhoods in the
central part of the city will have higher citizenship
levels than the neighborhoods which attract more
recent arrivals.12 Whereas according to Dr. Weber,
Cubans have a higher citizenship rate than other
groups. Dr. Moreno testified that due to the high
number of recent Hispanic arrivals tending to settle in
the South Beach area, there was a "higher level of
[Hispanic] non-citizenship and a higher level of
[Hispanic] non-registration" in South Beach than in
other areas of the city. Because of this, plaintiffs'
proposed 35th Senate district would not be an
effective district. Plaintiffs responded by noting that
their proposed 35th district does not consist entirely
of South Beach; rather, the lack of Hispanic citizens
in South Beach is balanced by the highly concentrated
Hispanic areas of Little Havana.
Defendants also argued that plaintiffs were
changing their position. According to defendants, in
the congressional redistricting hearings, plaintiffs had
contended that a 65% supermajority was necessary
for Hispanics to elect a candidate of choice, but now
they contend that a 59% or 62% supermajority would
allow them to do so. Plaintiffs explained that the
reason why plaintiffs advocated such a high VAP for
the Hispanic congressional districts was because only
two districts were being formed.'" Because
everyone agreed that only two Hispanic districts
would be drawn, "it ma[de] sense to hedge your bet
and make those districts as Hispanic as possible."
Furthermore, according to Dr. Arrington, a higher
minority VAP is necessary for congressional districts
to perform than for state legislative districts to
perform:
One would certainly want a somewhat higher black
VAP for Congressional districts than for the state
legislature because of the greater organization and
financing necessary to conduct a campaign at that
level. Arrington Aff. at 6. Although his analysis
specifically applies only to African-Americans, there
is no reason to suspect it would not also apply to
Hispanics.
The court finds that because minority groups have
a younger population than majority groups, a
supermajority of Hispanic and African-American total
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population is necessary in order to create an
opportunity for these groups to elect candidates of
their choice. Because Hispanics communities are
characterized by a large number of non citizens and
a lower voter registration and turnout rates, a
supermajority of Hispanic VAP is necessary to create
districts in which Hispanics can elect candidates of
choice. Like Hispanics, African-Americans must also
constitute a supermajority of the total population of
the district in order to elect a candidate of choice;
however, because of the recent increase in African-
American turnout and registration, a supermajority of
African-American VAP is not necessary in order to
elect an African-American candidate of choice.
Furthermore, although the court finds that both a
supermajority of Hispanic and African-American total
population and a supermajority of Hispanic VAP are
necessary, we decline to express these requirements
as exact percentages.
The court further finds that both the Senate
districts proposed by plaintiff- intervenors
Reaves/Brown/Hargrett and the House districts
proposed by the De Grandy plaintiffs would create
districts containing effective Hispanic voting
majorities. Each of the proposed Senate districts in
the Reaves/Brown plan and House districts in the De
Grandy plan contains an Hispanic VAP of at least
60%. Because the 65 percent rule already accounts
for citizenship, making another adjustment for
citizenship would overstate its importance and lead to
double counting.'" Finally, the fact that the
plaintiffs themselves are satisfied with these
percentages also tends to indicate the effectiveness of
the proposed districts. Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at
1438.
b. Geographical Compactness
Plaintiffs have shown that the Dade County's
Hispanic population is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in
four Senate and eleven House districts. Hispanics
constitute nearly one million persons in the Dade
County area, and the county has sufficient
concentrations of Hispanic population that can be
easily combined to create four Senate and eleven
House districts that contain effective Hispanic voting
majorities. Hispanics have primarily settled in three
sections of Dade: the Little Havana section of the
City of Miami, the "West Dade area" comprising the
communities of Sweetwater, Village Green,
Westchester and West Kendall, and the Northwest
section of the county consisting of the cities of
Hialeah, Miami Springs, and their surrounding
neighborhoods. There is also a sizeable Hispanic
(mostly Mexican) farm-worker community in the
Homestead area. The Cuban migration patterns went
from east to west-as Cubans improved economically,
they moved out of the Little Havana area into the
suburbs. With the exception of the Miami airport,
which separates Little Havana from Hialeah and
Miami Springs, the Hispanic population forms a
compact and contiguous line from Hialeah to Kendall.
The two most dramatic areas of Hispanic growth in
Dade County area along Miami Beach 5 and the
Kendall/West Kendall area.
The African-American population is also
sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in two Senate and four House
districts in Dade County.' 6 The concentrations of
the African-American population essentially rest in
the north central portion of urbanized Dade County
including Opa-Locka, Liberty City and Carol City.
There are also pockets of non-Hispanic
African-Americans in downtown Miami (including
Overtown), Coconut Grove, and Richmond Heights.
Finally, there are African-American neighborhoods in
Florida City, Homestead, Goulds, and South Miami.
The Allapattah area is the border zone between
African-American neighborhoods (to the east) and
Hispanic areas (to the west).
The court in Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777
F.Supp. 634 (N.D.Ill. 1991), noted that the Gingles
geographical compactness requirement is not "an
aesthetic concept." Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649. In
that case, most of Chicago/Cook County's Hispanic
population was "clustered into two dense enclaves,
one on Chicago's near northwest side and the, other
on the near southwest side," but that the two enclaves
were "less than a mile from each other at their
closest points." Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649.
Concluding that Chicago's Hispanic community was
geographically compact within the meaning of
Gingles despite the fact that the clusters were
separated, the court held that "[tlhe separation of
/clusters is not indicative of the existence of two
distinct communities, but appears to have occurred as
a result of exogenous physical and institutional
barriers." Hastert, 777 F.Supp. at 649. Despite the
fact the Hispanic community existed in two separate
enclaves, the court in Hastert concluded that the
Chicago/Cook County Hispanic community was
sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a single district majority. Hastert, 777
F.Supp. at 649.
Other courts have echoed the fact that compactness
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is not an aesthetic concept. In Dillard v. Baldwin
County Board of Education, 686 F.Supp. 1459,
1465-66 (M.D.Ala.1988), the court held that "[ain
aesthetic norm, by itself, would be not only unrelated
to the legal and social issues presented under Section
2, it would be an unworkable concept, resulting in
arbitrary and capricious results, because it offers no
guidance as to when it is met." The court in Wilson
v. Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379, 823 P.2d
545 (1992), held that the compactness requirement
should be used to promote the creation of functional
voting districts that allow for effective representation.
Specifically, the court held that Compactness does not
refer to geometric shapes but to the ability of citizens
to relate to each other and their representatives and to
the ability of representatives to relate effectively to
their constituency. Eu, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 387, 823
P.2d at 553.
In this case, plaintiffs testified that the primary
difference between their House plan and the Florida
House plan was that the De Grandy House plan
attempted to draw the Hispanic districts from north to
south while the state drew the districts from east to
west. The De Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs
and the DOJ argue that Florida's House plan
fragments and dilutes the Hispanic vote. Dr. Moreno
testified that House District 116 of the Florida plan
has an Hispanic VAP of 48 percent. Additionally,
Dr. Moreno pointed out that the line of District 116
separates heavily Hispanic neighborhoods in District
112 from the rest of the heavily hispanic Kendall
Lakes area and the Kendall area. Dr. Moreno
concluded that the Florida plan erects a barrier
between "neighbors making up the same, basically
what is the same housing development in Kendall
Lakes." Additionally, Dr. Moreno testified that in
order to protect a white incumbent the Florida plan
packs District 114 with an Hispanic VAP of over 78
percent. Dr. Moreno also pointed out that in District
102 and District 109 the State repeated the process of
fragmenting Hispanic communities. This court does
not find that the districts drawn by the De Grandy
plaintiffs are significantly less geographically compact
than those drawn by the state of Florida." Nor are
these districts "so unreasonably irregular, 'bizarre,'
or 'uncouth' as to approach obvious gerry-
mandering." Coleburn, 689 F.Supp. at 1437.
Furthermore, these districts are "relatively compact
and are in line with the configuration of electoral
districts that have been approved in other cases."
Finally, the court finds that the districts as drawn in
the De Grandy House and Senate plans would create
functional voting districts that allow for effective
representation.
2. Political Cohesiveness
The testimony showed that the Hispanics and
African-Americans were each politically cohesive
among themselves but were not at all cohesive-and
were often at odds-in relation to each other. There
is a high degree of tension in Dade County between
the African-American population and the Hispanic
population. Furthermore, while African Americans
tend to vote Democratic, Hispanic voters tend to vote
Republican. The focus of this Gingles prong,
however, is not the joint cohesiveness of two separate
minority groups, but rather whether "Hispanics" as a
group and/or "African-Americans" as a group are
politically cohesive.
a. Hispanic
The total Hispanic population of Dade County is
953,407 of which 55 percent is Cuban American.
Moreno Aff. at 5. It is estimated that during the
1980's, over 300,000 Latin Americans moved into
Dade County. Of these, the Mariel boatlift in 1980
brought in 125,000 Cuban refugees, while
Nicaraguans fleeing the Sandinista regime and civil
war in 1986 and 1987 numbered approximately
79,000.18 Thousands of Colombians, Peruvians,
Hondurans, Guatemalans and Puerto Ricans also
melded into Dade's flourishing Hispanic community
during the 1980s. According to the 1990 census,
non-Cuban hispanics account for 40.7% of the
Hispanic voters in Dade County.
The testimony showed that there is a high degree
of political cohesiveness among Cuban voters in Dade
County although the testimony was less clear about
the cohesiveness of non-Cuban Hispanics. Because
Dr. Moreno focused on Hispanics as a group and not
on the individual Hispanic subgroups, he was not able
to form any conclusions as to voting preferences of
these individual subgroups.' 9
In general, "the Hispanics in Dade County are
distinguished from Hispanics in the other part of the
country by being more conservative and much more
Republican." The strong loyalty Cuban-Americans
have to the Republican party is seen by their voting
patterns in several elections. In 1986, Republican
Bob Martinez carried the Hispanic precincts of Dade
over his Democratic opponent, receiving 79 percent
of the vote. In 1988, President George Bush carried
the Hispanic precincts of Dade County with over 85
percent of the vote, while Senator Connie Mack
carried the same districts with about 80 percent of the
vote. Between 1980 and 1990, Democratic party
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registration among Hispanics in Dade County
decreased from 49 to 24 percent, while Republican
registration increased from 39 to 68 percent. The
Cuban vote stands in stark contrast to that of other
Latinos across the United States who have
consistently supported the Democratic ticket by
two-to-one margins. The cohesiveness of Dade's
Hispanic community has also been buttressed by the
idealogical affinity of its two largest
groups-Nicaraguans and Cubans. These two groups
continually work together for a conservative foreign
policy agenda. According to Representative Miguel
De Grandy,' there is a union between Cuban-
Americans, Nicaraguans and other Central Americans
in basic philosophy, first to form policy because ...
they are basically political and not economic
migrations, unlike other Hispanic sectors of the
United States; they generally have a very
conservative, very anti-communist political
philosophy on the foreign affairs.
Dade County has a significant amount of Hispanic
African-Americans including immigrants from the
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico." Although
Dr. Moreno testified that Dominicans identified more
with the Hispanic culture than that of the African
Americans, the cohesiveness of the 70,000 Dade
County Puerto Ricans is less clear. According to Dr.
Moreno, Dade County Puerto Ricans seem to identify
with the language minority stronger than with the
racial minority. Furthermore, Dade County Puerto
Ricans tend to be more Republican and more
conservative than their Puerto Rican counterparts in
New York.' Nonetheless, the statistical evidence
shows that Puerto Ricans tend to register more as
Democrats (50%) than Republicans (40%). According
to Dr. Moreno, the fact that Puerto Ricans and
Cubans do not share the same party affiliation does
not mean that the two groups are not cohesive;
rather, Hispanic Democrats tend to vote for Hispanic
Republicans when they have that opportunity.
According to Representative De Grandy, the
various Hispanic groups tend to have very similar
views in the areas of education, housing, medically
needy programs among others. Furthermore, the
various Hispanic groups tend to have the same
political philosophy in areas such as civil rights and
discrimination. These groups have united to actively
oppose the English only initiative. According to Dr.
Moreno, "[tihe fear of language based discrimination
[both in the form of English only initiatives and
otherwise] has served to united Dade's Hispanic
communities.
We conclude that there is a sufficient degree of
political cohesiveness among Hispanics to satisfy the
second Gingles prong, although there might be
differences between the several Hispanic subgroups.
b. African-Americans
All of the evidence indicated that Dade County's
African-American community is cohesive. Dr.
Weber testified that African-Americans are
"generally" cohesive and tend to vote for Democratic
candidates in general elections. Dr. Lichtman
similarly testified that "blacks are politically
cohesive, ... unite in large numbers behind candidates
of their choice and ... prefer to elect black candidates
when there are elections with black candidates
competing against candidates of other races." Both
this court and Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice
Leander Shaw have previously held that the
approximately 590,000 African-American residents in
the Broward/Dade/Monroe county area" are
politically cohesive":
Black voters in Florida generally vote as a cohesive
racial block for the black candidate when there is a
black versus white choice on the ballot for a given
office. Furthermore, the testimony received in the
legislative hearings underscore this conclusion.
Accordingly, we conclude that both African-
Americans and Hispanics are politically cohesive
groups within the meaning of the second Gingles
prong.
3. White Block Voting
Dr. Allan J. Lichtman,l defines "racially
polarized voting" as "the extent to which members of
distinct racial or ethnic groups support different
candidates of their choice." Racially polarized voting
can be subdivided into two parts: minority cohesion,
which is the extent to which minority voters support
candidates of their choice, and white bloc voting,
which is the extent to which whites support different
candidates. According to Dr. Lichtman, "[riacially
polarized voting is politically significant if, under a
given electoral system, it impedes the opportunities
for minority voters to elect candidates of their
choice."
There was a substantial amount of testimony--both
during the Congressional redistricting hearings and
the state legislative hearings-that voting in Dade
County is racially polarized. The court notes Chief
Justice Leander Shaw's conclusion in In re
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Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G
Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So.2d 276,
290 (Fla.1992) (Shaw, C.J., dissenting) that "[tihe
results of Florida's legislative elections over the past
ten years established the presence of racially
polarized voting." Likewise, Dr. Arrington stated that
"most elections involving both Afro- Americans and
Hispanics are racially polarized." Furthermore,
according to Dr. Iichtman The results reported in
Table 1 [exhibit to government exhibit 46] show a
clear pattern of racially polarized voting, Hispanic
cohesion, and white bloc voting. It also shows that
black voters united with white voters in opposition to
Hispanic candidates for Senate and House
positions'.... The results reported in Table I
likewise show a pattern of strong bloc voting by
whites for non-Hispanic candidates ( ... and] indicate
that blacks joined with whites in opposing Hispanic
Senate and House candidates.... These findings of
Hispanic cohesion and white bloc voting are
supported by the analyses of additional local elections
in Dade County.
Furthermore, The high degree of racially polarized
voting documented for legislative elections in Dade
County indicates that Hispanic voters would have an
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice only in
Districts with Hispanic voting-age majorities. Other-
wise white bloc voting would usually be sufficient to
defeat the candidate of choice of Hispanic voters.
Finally, the reports prepared by consultants for the
state also recognize that because of the strong
polarization between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in
Dade County, opportunities for Hispanics to elect
candidates of their choice are impeded.
According to Dr. Moreno, Dade County is
profoundly divided by the competing interests of
three distinct and separate ethnic groups-African
American, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic White--each
of whom has different social and economic interests.
According to Dr. Moreno, "[tihe division of Dade
along ethnic lines has made Miami the contemporary
symbol of racial upheaval in America." There is a
"high degree of tension in Dade County between the
Afro-American population and the Hispanic
population." Furthermore, the division of the three
major ethnic groups has led to the development of
tripartite politics in Miami; that is, ethnic factors
between the three communities predominate over all
other factors in Dade politics.
According to Dr. Moreno, "[mlinorities are usually
only able to elect their candidates when they are
firmly in the majority." Furthermore, "white
candidates are aided by the deep cleavages between
Republican Hispanics and Democratic Blacks."
According to Dr. Moreno, there are four types of
racially polarized elections in Miami: First, [there]
are races featuring a Hispanic candidate versus a
White candidate with Black[s] supporting the White
candidate; Second, a Black candidate versus a White
candidate with Hispanic voters supporting the White
candidate; third, a Black candidate versus a Hispanic
candidate with White voters holding the balance of
power, and finally the[re] are races between two
candidates of the same ethnic group in which voters
from the other two group[s] support the least ethnic
of the two candidates.
Dr. Moreno cites specific examples of recent races
in which ethnic factors predominated over all others
including the congressional race between Gerald
Richman and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen where "[tihe
campaign strategies of both campaigns were based
purely on ethnic calculations." Cuban-Americans,
offended by the perceived racism of Richman, voted
for Ros- Lehtinen by a margin of 88 to 12 percent.
Although Richman carried all of the other blocs of
voters-Jewish, Anglo, and Black-because these
voters represented only 47 percent of the electorate,
Richman lost the race. According to Dr. Moreno,
"Ros-Lehtinen won simply because more Cubans
voted and almost all of them voted for
Ros-Lehtinen."
In 1990, two Hispanic incumbents almost lost their
seats in the state legislature to non-Hispanic White
challengers. Javier Souto was barely re-elected to the
State Senate from the 40th district when Tom
Easterly won 74 percent of the non-Hispanic White
vote and 92 percent of the Black vote.? Souto was
able to defeat his Anglo opponent by winning over 80
percent of the Hispanic vote. State Representative Al
Gutman also nearly lost his 105 district seat to a
non-Hispanic White candidate. His challenger, Steve
Leifman, won 42 percent of the vote in this heavily
Hispanic district by carrying two-thirds of the
non-Hispanic White vote and 83 percent of the
African-American vote. Gutman survived by winning
92 percent of the Hispanic vote. In another race,
Hispanic challenger Orlando Cruz was easily defeated
by incumbent Art Simon in an ethnically polarized
election in the I16th District despite the fact that
Cruz carried 77 percent of the Latin vote. According
to Dr. Moreno, "this pattern of ethnic polarized
voting against Hispanics was not restricted to the
1990 elections." Rather, "[tihe pattern of bloc voting
by non-Latin Whites and Blacks against Hispanics is
found in elections at all levels against both Latin
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challengers and incumbents."
African-Americans have also been the victims of
block voting. According to Dr. Moreno, 'Black
candidates faced with a White-Hispanic coalition and
lacking adequate finances have largely been limited to
running in the three state House districts (106, 107,
108) and in the one state Senate district (36) where
Blacks comprised an overwhelming majority." In
1986, Bob Starks, a White Republican, barely beat
Nathaniel Edmond, an African-American Democrat
in the general election for state House district 118.
Despite the fact that Democrats out-registered
Republicans in this district 21,202 to 9,968, Stark
won by carrying nearly all of the White votes in the
district. This occurred despite the fact that Edmond
had the support of almost all of the African-American
voters.? In 1990, Darryl Jones, a African-
American Democrat won the election despite losing
the white vote. Jones beat John Minchew 64 to 36
percent because more African-Americans turned out
at the polls and he carried enough of the White vote
(24 percent) to put him over the top. According to
Dr. Moreno, block voting is not limited to legislative
races, for "Black[ ] candidates have also fared poorly
in seeking county-wide office."
4. Additional Findings
The history of discrimination against African-
Americans in Florida was addressed in depth in our
order of May 29, 1992 and will not be restated here.
The court also finds sufficient evidence of language
based discrimination against Dade County Hispanics.
According to Dr. Moreno, "lt]he fear of an
anti-Spanish backlash has been reinforced by English
only initiatives, at both the county and state level,
which seem to be specifically aimed at Miami's Latin
population." In his affidavit, Dr. Moreno also cites
specific examples of language based discrimination
including the suspension of a supermarket clerk for
speaking Spanish in front of customers and the
refusal of a personnel agency to refer people with
foreign accents to job openings at a Miami bank.
The record clearly established that Florida's
minorities have borne the social, economic and
political effects of this discrimination. This is true
despite the fact that Cubans have fared relatively well
in South Florida. Although Miami has a Cuban
mayor and South Florida is the home of three Cuban
state senators, language based discrimination still
exists in South Florida. While the witnesses
disagreed as to whether Hispanics or African-
Americans bore more of the brunt of discrimination,
everyone agreed that both groups had suffered." In
fact, as a result of this discrimination, the United
States DOJ must preclear five Florida counties
pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as
amended. Section 1973 et seq. Those counties are
Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough and
Monroe.?
In this case, the DOJ and the De Grandy/Reaves/
Humphrey plaintiffs have established that Florida's
Senate reapportionment plan dilutes the voting
strength of Hispanics in Dade County and the
surrounding areas. Additionally, plaintiff NAACP
has established that Florida's Senate reapportionment
plan dilutes the voting strength of African-Americans
in Dade County and the surrounding areas. With
respect to Florida's House reapportionment plan, all
of the parties have agreed that Florida's plan
fragments the African-American community in
Escambia County.3' The DOJ and the De Grandy/
Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs have also established that
Florida's House reapportionment plan dilutes the
voting strength of Hispanics in Dade County. We
must now fashion a remedy.
III. REMEDY
A. The Senate
Florida's new Senate plan (Plan 330) creates five
minority- majority districts of which two have
African-American voting age population (VAP)
majorities and three have Hispanic VAP majorities.
The three Hispanic VAP majority districts and one of
the African-American VAP majority districts are
contained wholly within Dade County. The other
African-American VAP majority district is contained
in the South Florida counties of Broward and Palm
Beach. In the three Hispanic VAP majority districts,
Hispanics constitute the following percentages of the
VAP: (1) District 34--66.3 percent; (2) District
37--64.3 percent; and (3) District 39-76.1 percent.
African- Americans constitute 52.5 percent of the
VAP of District 36 in Dade County, and 51.7 percent
of the VAP in the Broward/Palm Beach district,
District 30. The Senate reapportionment plan creates
seven Dade County districts of which five districts
are wholly within Dade County and two additional
districts are comprised of portions of Dade County
and the surrounding areas.
The DOJ and the De Grandy/Reaves/
Humphrey plaintiffs take exception to Florida's
Senate reapportionment plan as it pertains to Dade
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County because the state's proposed plan fragments
the Hispanic population concentrations such that
Hispanics comprise a majority of the VAP only in
three districts. Specifically, the DOJ and the De
Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs point out that as
a result of Florida's Senate reapportionment plan
28.55 percent of the Hispanic population of Dade
County will reside in state Senate districts that
Hispanics will have no possibility of winning. See
Moreno Aff. at 32-38. The DOJ and the De
Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs contend that if
the racial and ethnic population concentrations
existing in the Dade County area are divided into
equally populated Senate districts which respect
communities of interest and follow other
non-discriminatory plan drawing criteria, Hispanics
would constitute a significant voting age majority of
the population in an additional Senate district. In our
order dealing with congressional redistricting, we
held that "the voting age population (VAP) is the
relevant number to be used in determining whether
minorities in a particular district will be able to elect
a candidate of their choice." De Grandy v.
Wetherell, Nos. TCA 92-40015-WS, 92- 40131-WS,
slip op. at 16 (N.D.Fla. May 29, 1992) (citing
Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1018). The court in Ketchum
explained that VAP is the best measure of minority
voting strength because age is a legal prerequisite to
voting and minority groups generally have a younger
population which comprise a large proportion of the
individuals who are ineligible to vote. Ketchum, 740
F.2d at 1412-1413. Because minority groups
generally have a younger population than majority
groups, the use of VAP as the relevant number for
creating minority- majority districts requires that
minority groups constitute a supermajority of the total
population of an electoral district. See Ketchum, 740
F.2d at 1412-1413.
Additionally, our congressional order held that
"because Hispanic communities are characterized by
a large number of noncitizens and lower voter
registration rates, a supermajority of the VAP is
necessary to create districts in which Hispanics can
elect candidates of their choice." In determining
whether a fourth district can be created in which
Hispanics constitute a supermajority of the VAP, we
must consider "emerging changes in sociological and
electoral characteristics of minority groups and broad
changes in political attitudes." Ketchum, 740 F.2d at
1416. These changes may alter, or eliminate the
need for a supermajority corrective figure. Ketchum,
740 F.2d at 1416.
In this case, the DOJ and the De Grandy/Reaves/
Humphrey plaintiffs have established that Hispanics
can elect candidates of their choice in Dade county
and its surrounding areas when the Hispanics
constitute at least 59 percent of an electoral district's
VAP. Dr. Lichtman testified that in Dade County
and its surrounding areas "[n]o Hispanic candidates
have been elected in districts below a 59 percent
Hispanic level, and in districts at 59 percent and
above, those districts have in every instance elected
Hispanic candidates." Based on the record as a
whole, we find that the electoral characteristics of
Hispanics in Dade County indicate that 60 percent is
an appropriate guideline for determining if a fourth
Hispanic VAP supermajority district can be created
in the Dade County area. We note, however, that in
areas with high concentrations of recent Hispanic
arrivals, such as the South Beach area of Miami, an
effective VAP supermajority district must have a
VAP higher than our 60 percent guideline level.
The De Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs have
established that four geographically compact districts
can be drawn in which Hispanics in Dade County
would have the potential to elect candidates of their
choice. Plaintiff Reaves submitted Plan 180 which
creates four Hispanic VAP supermajority districts.
In Plan 180's four majority Hispanic districts,
Hispanics constitute the following percentages of the
VAP: (1) District 33-66.8 percent; (2) District
34--65.0 percent; (3) District 35--65.7 percent; and
(4) District 40--62.1 percent.' Although this plan
remedies the dilution of the Hispanic vote, we must
examine the extent to which the plan addresses the
African-Americans' vote dilution claim.
Plan 180, like Florida's Senate plan, creates two
African-American VAP majority districts.
Nevertheless, these two districts do not fully address
the vote dilution claim of African-Americans. The
NAACP takes exception to Florida's Senate
reapportionment plan as it pertains to Dade County
and the surrounding areas because the state's
proposed plan fragments the African- American
population concentrations such that
African-Americans comprise a majority of the VAP
in only two South Florida districts. Specifically, the
NAACP contends that if the racial and ethnic
population concentrations existing in the Dade County
area are divided into equally populated Senate
districts which respect communities of interest and
follow other non-discriminatory plan drawing criteria,
African-Americans would constitute a voting age
majority of the population in an additional Senate
district.
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Like Hispanics, African-Americans must also
constitute a supermajority of the total population of a
district in order to be able to elect candidates of their
choice due to a young population. See Ketchum, 740
F.2d at 1412- 1413. African-Americans, however,
may not need a supermajority of the VAP of a
district because the minority group has experienced
changes in its electoral characteristics. We take
judicial notice of the fact that Jesse Jackson's 1984
and 1988 presidential campaigns stimulated
African-American registration and turn-outnationally.
See Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1416 n. 21. Thus, we
find that because of changing African-American
electoral characteristics, a simple majority of the
VAP is an appropriate guideline for determining if a
third African-American majority VAP district can be
created in the Dade County area.
The NAACP has established that three
geographically compact districts can be drawn in
which African-Americans in Dade County would
constitute a majority of the VAP and have the
potential to elect candidates of their choice. The
NAACP submitted a plan which creates three
African-American VAP majority districts. Two of the
African-American VAP majority districts consist of
Dade County area residents with one district spilling
over into areas of Broward County. The other South
Florida African-American VAP majority district is in
the Broward/Palm Beach area and is comparable to
the Broward/Palm Beach district in Florida's Senate
reapportionment plan. In the NAACP plan's three
African- American VAP majority districts,
African-Americans constitute the following
percentages of the VAP: (1) District 39 in
Dade-51.7 percent; (2) District 37 in Dade and
Broward-53.6 percent; and (3) District 35 in
Broward and Palm Beach-51.6 percent. This plan's
creation of three African-American VAP majority
districts remedies the dilution of the
African-American vote in the South Florida,
however, it fails to address the vote dilution claim of
Hispanics in Dade County because the plan only
creates three Hispanic VAP supermajority districts.
This court is faced with two independent, viable
Section 2 claims in South Florida and our remedy
must address both of those claims. An ideal solution
would be to order the drawing of four supermajority
VAP Hispanic districts and three majority VAP
African-American districts in South Florida. The
evidence in this case, however, established that the
ideal remedy for the Section 2 violations in this case
is not a viable option. During the course of the
examination of John Gutherie, Staff Director of the
Senate Committee on Reapportionment, the court
inquired about the possibility of creating a plan
containing four Hispanic and three African-American
districts. JUDGE HATCHETT: Yes, he has the
answer. I have a question, though. From all of your
experience working in South Florida, is it possible to
draw four VAP majority Hispanic districts and three
majority black districts? .... THE WITNESS: It's
amazing, Your Honor, what you can do with these
computers.... If you ask me would I believe that you
could do it, I would believe that. But it gets to the
notion of-because of numerosity--of how thin you're
willing to cut your margins on both the
African-American and the Hispanic seats, cutting
them down to a bare VAP majority in order to
accomplish that. JUDGE HATCHETT: You've
answered my question. In trying to create a plan
with four Hispanic supermajority VAP districts and
three African-American majority VAP districts, the
NAACP was confronted with Gutherie's
"numerosity" concern and his concern over how
much of a margin is necessary to insure that
minorities have opportunities to elect candidates of
choice.
Counsel for the NAACP, Charles Burr, informed
the court that "it is technically feasible to draw a four
and three, but we were completely unable to get the
percentages of the districts up to a level that I believe
the parties will find acceptable." Thus, the NAACP
concluded that in order to create four Hispanic
supermajority VAP districts and three
African-American majority VAP districts, the number
of minorities found in each district can be no more
than our bare VAP majority guidelines. Additionally,
the NAACP realized that these districts would contain
an insufficient level or margin to ensure that
minorities would have the opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice.
After realizing that the NAACP had also
established a Section 2 violation with respect to
African-Americans, in that a third African-American
VAP majority district could be created, plaintiff
Reaves argued to the court that Plan 180 is in fact a
"four-three plan." To establish that Plan 180 does in
fact create three African-American VAP majority
districts in addition to its four Hispanic VAP
supermajority districts, plaintiff Reaves compared his
African-American districts to those found in the
NAACP's plan. Plaintiff Reaves contends that the
NAACP's District 37, which is comprised of
Broward and Dade Counties, is comparable to Plan
180's District 32 which also covers Broward and
Dade County. Additionally, Reaves points out that
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the NAACP's District 39 which is wholly within
Dade County, is comparable to Plan 180's District 36
which is also wholly within Dade County. Finally,
Reaves argues that District 35 in the NAACP plan, a
Broward/Palm Beach Senate seat, is comparable to
Plan 180's District 28 which goes through Broward
and St. Lucie County. Thus, plaintiff Reaves asserts
that Plan 180 creates, in essence, three
African-American VAP majority districts without
diluting the Hispanic vote.
Contrary to the assertions of plaintiff Reaves, we
find that Plan 180 does not create three
African-American majority VAP districts, and in fact,
dilutes the African-American vote. Plan 180's third
"African-American seat," District 28, does not
contain an African-American majority VAP.
African-Americans in District 28 of Plan 180 only
constitutes 47.1 percent of the VAP. Gutherie
describes this less than majority seat as follows: What
is sometimes referred to as an access or influence
seat begins in the Pompano Beach area north of Ft.
Lauderdale, proceeds up to West Palm Beach and
then across the Everglades into-the Everglades
agricultural area-into Ft. Myers and northward
through St. Lucie County, Ft. Pierce into Vero Beach
and Indian River County. Gutherie also points out
that the configuration of District 28 is the result of
Plan 180's inclusion of African-Americans in Ft.
Lauderdale and the adjoining communities into
District 32, the Plan's second African- American
majority district which is comprised of portions of
Dade and Broward Counties. Specifically, Gutherie
notes that: Because this large concentration
population in downtown Ft. Lauderdale is not
available for a further access seat or majority society
north of Dade County, what Plan 180 has to do in
order to accomplish that end is string a district as we
discussed earlier, District 28, going from Pompano
Beach north to Vero Beach and Indian River County,
and west of Ft. Myers on the Gulf Coast. Thus,
based on the record as a whole we find that Plan 180
does not create three African-American VAP majority
districts.
Not only does Plan 180 fail to create a third
African-American majority VAP district, Plan 180 is
retrogressive to African-Americans in Dade County
and the surrounding areas. With respect to the two
African-American majority VAP districts and Plan
180, Dr. Weber testified that after analyzing the
turnout for those particular districts, that it was his
opinion that based upon that analysis of turnout, the
same kind of analysis I did for the Hispanic districts,
that those districts are designed-and I'm sorry to use
these words, and they may be offensive to some
people in the courtroom, but they are designed to
waste African-American votes.... They are packed,
and there are more African-Americans than are
necessary to provide a realistic opportunity for
African-Americans to elect candidates of choice.
Additionally, with respect to District 28, Dr. Weber
testified that his turnout test for that district indicated
that it would "fail miserably in terms of [its] ability
to put African-Americans in control on the general
election day." Thus, Dr. Weber concluded that Plan
180's packing of African-Americans into District 32
and 36 in order to facilitate the creation of four
Hispanic supermajority VAP districts, had a
"decimating effect" on the possibility of creating an
additional African-American majority seat in South
Florida. Based on the record, we find that plan 180
creates only two African-American majority VAP
districts and its third African- American access
district has tested to be ineffective. Thus, Plan 180
is in essence a four/two plan which continues to
dilute the African-American vote.
After considering all of the evidence, this court
came to the conclusion that the remedy for the
Hispanics' Section 2 claim in South Florida and the
remedy for the African-Americans' Section 2 claim
in South Florida were mutually exclusive. The state
of Florida, faced with the competing interests of
Hispanics and African-Americans in Dade County,
sought to strike the fairest balance in its Senate
reapportionment plan with respect to all the Dade
County ethnic communities. The Supreme Court has
held that: Reapportionment is primarily a matter for
legislative consideration and determination ... state
legislatures have 'primary jurisdiction' over
legislative reapportionment.... A federal district
court, in the context of legislative reapportionment,
should follow the policies and preferences of the
state, as expressed in statutory and constitutional
provisions, or in the reapportionment plans proposed
by the state legislative, whenever adherence to state
policy does not detract from the requirements of the
federal Constitution. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S.
37, 41, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 1521, 71 L.Ed.2d 725
(1982) (quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795,
93 S.Ct. 2348, 2354, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973)).
Because state legislatures have primary jurisdiction
over legislative reapportionment, we must examine
the state of Florida's policy choices and preferences
as we determine the proper remedy for balancing the
competing minority interests in South Florida.
Realizing that the creation of a fourth Hispanic VAP
supermajority district would adversely affect African-
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Americans in South Florida and that the creation of
a third VAP majority district would adversely affect
Hispanics in Dade County, the Florida Senate plan
reaches a compromise in that it creates three
supermajority Hispanic VAP districts and two
majority African-American districts with a strong
African- American influence district in the Dade
County area.
The influence district in the Florida plan, as
Gutherie describes, commences in the Liberty
City/Overtown area, proceeds south through the
Black Grove, Black Coral Gables, and south in Dade
County through Leisure City, Richmond Heights,
down and through Homestead and finally ending in
Florida City. That district also includes Monroe
County. The overall African-American VAP of that
district is 35.5 percent. The district includes, by the
way, most of current House District 118. House
District 118 is a district which has 26 percent
African-American VAP, 30 percent Hispanic VAP.
In 1990, Tom Easterly, a white incumbent, left a seat
in order to run for the Florida Senate. There was a
primary, a democratic primary, which was contested
by two African-Americans. Those were the only two
people on the ballot. And the winner of that
primary, Daryl Jones, won the general election by a
margin of 65 percent over the Republican opponent.
This influence district, District 40, in the Florida
Senate reapportionment plan, creates in essence a
district in which African-Americans can elect a
candidate of their choice because of strong minority
coalitions between the African-Americans and the
Mexican-Americans, as well as white cross-over
votes. Representative Willie Logan, Chairman of the
Florida Caucus of Black State Legislators, testified
that: The Joint Resolution as adopted by the Supreme
Court better represents the black community not only
in Dade County, but in south Florida. And the
reasons for that are very simple: first of all, the seat
that's in south Dade, which is only a thirty- some-
odd-percent voting age population seat, also includes
non-Cuban Republican Hispanics, that which are the
Mexican community, which have proven over a
period of time that they support not only Democratic
candidates, but they are willing to support black
candidates. And that was an example in the Daryl
Jones House seat that also was testified at the south
Dade hearing by the American-Mexican community,
that they prefer to be in the district that would be
represented by a black versus being in a district that
would was being Republican. Additionally,
Representative Logan testified that the Florida Senate
reapportionment plan comported closely with the
desires of African-Americans with respect to having
an African-American district based in the Ft.
Lauderdale area of Broward County, and two
African-American districts based in Dade County.
Thus, this court finds that the Florida Senate
Reapportionment Plan's Dade County African-
American influence district performs as a third
African-American district without adversely affecting
Hispanics in the Dade County area. The court in
DeBaca, noted in discussing balancing the interest
between two minority groups that Federal courts have
recognized that these political questions do exist and
that the best means to resolve them is in the process
of give-and-take between citizens and their elected
officials. Political questions necessarily require that
policy choices be made before they can be resolved.
This is not a task federal courts are equipped to
handle. They have recognized their shortcomings in
this area, and will, whenever possible, defer to
legislative policy choices, even if the choice is
perceived to be unwise or is simply not the optimum
choice. DeBaca, 794 F.Supp. at 992-93 (citing
Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to
Communities Containing Two or More Minority
Groups-When is the Whole Greater than the Sum of
the Parts?, 20 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 95, 124- 125
(1989)). We find that between all the plans presented
to the court, the Florida Senate Reapportionment plan
is the fairest to all the ethnic communities in Dade
County and the surrounding areas, and is the proper
remedy in this case. Consequently, this court gives
deference to the state policy as expressed in the
Florida plan as validated by the Florida Supreme
Court and imposes that plan as the remedy in this
case.
B. The House
Florida's House plan creates thirteen
minority-majority districts of which nine have
Hispanic VAP supermajority districts and four have
African- American VAP majority districts. Eight of
the nine Hispanic districts are contained in Dade
County and the ninth Hispanic district is in Collier
County. The four districts containing an
African-American majority VAP are contained in
Dade County. In the nine Hispanic supermajority
VAP districts, Hispanics constitute the following
percentages of the VAP: (1) District 102--65.68
percent; (2) District 107--63.85 percent; (3) District
110 is 83.64 percent; (4) District 111 76.56 percent;
(5) District 112-68.67 percent; (6) District
113--75.70 percent; (7) District 114--78.38 percent;
(8) District 115--65.28 percent; and (9) District
117-69.18 percent. African- American constitute the
following percentages of the VAP in the four
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African- American districts: (1) District 103-55.73
percent; (2) District 104-50.96 percent; (3) District
108-57.24 percent; and (4) District 109-55.21
percent. Florida's House reapportionment plan
creates twenty Dade County districts of which
seventeen are wholly within Dade County and two
share populations with other counties. District 102
joins population in Dade County with Collier County,
and District 120 joins population in southern Dade
County with Monroe County.
The De Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs and
the DOJ take exception to Florida's House
reapportionment plan as it pertains to Dade County
because Florida's House plan fragments the Hispanic
population concentrations such that Hispanics
constitute a majority in only nine House districts.
The plaintiffs contend that if the Dade County area of
the State is divided into equally populated House
districts which respect communities of interests and
follow other nondiscriminatory plan-drawing criteria,
Hispanics would constitute a supermajority of the
VAP in two additional House districts.
For reasons already discussed in connection with
the Senate, we hold that VAP is the relevant number
for creating minority-majority House districts and that
a supermajority of the VAP is necessary to create
districts in which Hispanics can elect candidates of
their choice. Additionally, we note that a
supermajority VAP of 60 percent is an appropriate
guideline for determining if two additional Hispanic
districts can be created in the Dade County area. In
this case, the DOJ and the De Grandy/Reaves/
Humphrey plaintiffs have established that eleven
geographically compact districts can be drawn in
which Hispanics in Dade County would have the
potential to elect candidates of their choice.
The De Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs
submitted the De Grandy plan which creates eleven
Hispanic supermajority VAP districts. Hispanics
constitute the following percentages of the VAP in
the De Grandy plan's eleven Hispanic districts: (1)
District 105-71 percent; (2) District 108-78.2
percent; (3) District 109-64.6 percent; (4) District
110-66.2 percent; (5) District 111--65.8 percent;
(6) District 112--64.5 percent; (7) District 113-66.6
percent; (8) District 114--65.8 percent; (9) District
115--68.2 percent; (10) District 116-65.8; and (11)
District 117--65.6 percent. This plan remedies the
dilution of the Hispanic vote and does not adversely
affect African-Americans because it creates four
African-American districts. In the four
African-American districts, African-Americans
constitute the following percentages of the VAP: (1)
District 102-57.6 percent; (2) District 103- 57.8
percent; (3) District 106-57.7 percent and (4)
District 107- 57.3 percent.
Pursuant to Upham v. Seamon and White v.
Weiser, this court sought to limit its intrusion upon
state policy to what was necessary to correct the
Section 2 violation. Accordingly, we allowed the
State of Florida to present another House plan which
remedied the dilution of the Hispanic vote and
preserved its policy choices. The Florida House
defendants initially presented a remedy containing
only ten Hispanic districts which this court rejected as
not fully remedying the dilution of the Hispanic vote.
After warning the court to be very careful and
deliberate in considering any changes to the Florida
House plan, the Florida House defendants presented
another remedial plan.
The Florida House defendants' second remedial
plan contained eleven Hispanic supermajority VAP
districts and four African-American VAP districts. In
the House defendants' second remedial plan, the
changes were confined to Dade County. The eleven
Hispanic districts in the Florida House defendants'
second remedial plan contain the following Hispanic
VAP percentages: (1) District 102--65.78 percent;
(2) District 106--61.34 percent; (3) District
107--61.05 percent; (4) District 110-77.66 percent;
(5) District 111-77.39 percent; (6) District
112--62.77 percent; (7) District 113--62.22 percent;
(8) District 114-65.23 percent; (9) District
115--65.29 percent; (10) District 116--65.60; and
(11) District 117 at 63.81 percent. With respect to
African-Americans, the second remedial plan created
four African-American districts containing the
following African-American VAP percentages: (1)
District 103-61.51 percent; (2) District 104-55.10
percent; (3) District 108-55.25 percent; and (4)
District 109--64.60 percent.
Because the Florida House defendants arbitrarily
confined its changes to Dade County, the House
defendants' second remedial plan does not create
eleven effective House districts which give Hispanics
the potential to elect the candidates of their choice.
The second remedial House plan creates two House
districts in the Miami beach area which as we noted
earlier has high concentrations of recent arrivals and
non-citizens. Additionally, these two districts,
District 106 and District 107, have Hispanic VAP of
61 percent. We noted in our discussion of Florida's
Senate plan that areas with high concentrations of
recent Hispanic arrivals must have a VAP
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significantly higher than our 60 percent guideline
level. Because these two 61 percent districts are
located in areas with high concentrations of recent
Hispanic arrivals, we find that these districts do not
give Hispanics a reasonable opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice. Hence, we reject the
Florida House defendants' second remedial plan
because it failed to remedy the dilution of the
Hispanic vote in South Florida.
The De Grandy/Reaves/Humphrey plaintiffs
presented the modified De Grandy plan which sought
to respect the policy choices of the state of Florida by
merging the De Grandy remedy for South Florida
into the existing Florida plan. The eleven Hispanic
South Florida districts in the modified De Grandy
plan contain the following Hispanic VAP percentages:
(1) District 105-71.62 percent; (2) District
108-81.89 percent; (3) District 109-63.74 percent;
(4) District 110-62.56 percent; (5) District
111--66.19 percent; (6) District 112--65.10 percent;
(7) District 113--66.06 percent; (8) District
114--66.39 percent; (9) District 115-68.52 percent;
(10) District 116--65.83 percent; and (11) District
117-66.24 percent. With respect to African-
Americans in South Florida, the modified De Grandy
plan creates four African-American districts
containing the following African-American VAP
percentages: (1) District 102- 55.12 percent; (2)
District 103-59.54 percent; (3) District 106-57.93
percent; and (4) District 107-56.46 percent. The
modified De Grandy plan also creates a strong
African-American access district in South Florida
with an African-American VAP of 40.34 percent.
The modified De Grandy plan of course contained
minor adjustments to district lines outside of Dade
County in order to comply with the rule of "one
person, one vote." Plaintiff De Grandy testified that:
What we tried to do in the De Grandy Modified was
to as much as possible enhance a little more the-a
couple of the African-American seats while at the
same time not impacting and trying to fit in the plan
not impacting any other county than that which was
impacted by Dade. That includes Dade; Monroe,
which had a district in the Florida plan coming into
Dade; Collier, which had a district in the Florida plan
coming into Dade and Broward County. When you fit
the plan, you have to not only fit the configuration,
but also in terms of half the population of each
district you have to deviate to comport with the plan
you are fitting into. And while doing that, we also,
when we were deviating that population tried to in
effect, you know, boost our seats or minority seats
more than they are in the De Grandy plan. So,
basically, Your Honor, what we are really arguing is,
Your Honors, please accept the De Grandy plan and
accept it in the manner we have inserted it. That's
what we are really arguing. The plaintiffs are correct
that in adopting a South Florida remedy adjustments
must be made between what is in the Florida plan
north of Dade and what the court adopts. The total
enfranchisement of the minority populations in Dade
County through creating a fair plan, causes a "ripple
effect" into other counties leaving the problem of
how to adjust the affected districts. The modified De
Grandy plan minimized this "ripple effect" to eleven
districts outside of Dade County. We find that the
modified De Grandy plan best remedies the dilution
of the Hispanic vote in South Florida while advancing
the interests of African-Americans in South Florida.
Accordingly, this court adopted the modified De
Grandy plan as the court's plan and imposed that
plan.
IV. CONCLUSION
This court issued orders following the completion
of this case which carried out the conclusions
expressed in this opinion. We held in our order
imposing the .1992 Florida Senate Plan that the
Florida Senate plan does not violate Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended. This
language should be read as holding that the Florida
Senate plan does not violate Section 2 such that a
different remedy must be imposed. In other words,
although the Florida Senate plan violates Section 2 of
the voting rights act, it nevertheless is the best
remedy to balance the competing minority interests in
Dade County and the South Florida area. With
respect to Florida's House of Representatives
Districts we adopted the Modified De Grandy House
of Representative Plan, Plan 268, as the court's plan
and also impose that plan.
VINSON, District Judge, concurring.
I join in the opinion, but set out separately
my rationale for the result.
(1) Section 2 claims under the Voting Rights Act
must meet the three- part test of Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766-
67, 92 L.Ed.2d 25, 46-47 (1986): (a) a minority
population that "is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority" in a
district; (b) a "politically cohesive" minority group;
and (c) a white majority that "votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate."
165
(2) For Dade County, the second and third parts of
the test are established by the overwhelming weight
of the evidence in this case, subject to some
variations among Hispanics from different counties of
origin, and subject to the distinction that the Hispanic
minorities are generally diametrically opposed to the
voting preferences of the African-American
minorities.
(3) Thus, the issue in both the challenge to the
Florida Plan for the state Senate districts and for the
state House districts in Dade County is a very narrow
one: Have the plaintiffs established that the minority
populations are sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a voting age majority in a
district?
(4) Regarding the Senate challenge, the Hispanic
plaintiffs established that they could have a fourth
Hispanic-majority district that would be
geographically compact, but only by either diluting
the voting strength of African-American majority
districts or by preserving such strength in districts
that are not geographically compact. The
African-American plaintiffs established that they
could create a third African-American majority
district only by using a district that was not
geographically compact and which would also greatly
dilute the voting strength of Hispanics. Moreover, it
is impossible to accommodate both four Hispanics
and three African-American majority districts in any
acceptable manner. Therefore, while the plaintiffs
have established a Section 2 violation as to the four
Hispanic districts, any remedy implementing the
fourth district would violate Section 2 as to African-
Americans. Thus, the existing Florida Plan for the
Senate districts best accommodates the competing
interests of both Hispanics and African-Americans.
(5) Regarding the House challenge, the plaintiffs
have established in the De Grandy plan that eleven
districts can be established in which Hispanics
constitute over 64% of the voting age population and
which are geographically compact. Further, these
districts can be drawn without any dilution of
African-American voting strength. Therefore,
plaintiffs have 75 established all requisites of their
Section 2 claim as to the Dade County districts for
the House of Representatives.
(5)(a) The defendants have attempted to show that
it is the citizen Hispanic voting age population that is
determinative. That Hispanic citizenship data is not
available, however. Despite the lack of available
data, the defendants presented estimates of Hispanic
citizenship and attempted to apply them to the
individual districts. Those estimates are unreliable.
For example, William De Grove's analysis was based
on a somewhat unorthodox regression analysis
methodology that gave a range of non-citizenship
rates of 9.5% for precincts with no Hispanics to 55%
for precincts with 100% Hispanic voters.
(Acknowledging, of course, that there is no stich
precinct.) He recognized that the error in that
analysis was greatest at the extremes, i.e. at the 9.5%
and 55% intercepts. Nevertheless, he used the 55%
as the basis of all his citizenship calculations.
Plainly, his estimated Hispanic citizenship ratios for
the eleven districts must be viewed with low
confidence and with a large range of error.
(5)(b) A better gauge of eligible voters within a
district is the analysis of past election results. Those
statistics established that Hispanics would be able to
elect Hispanic candidates of choice in all eleven
districts proposed by plaintiffs, and those statistics
automatically account for voter citizenship,
registration, and turn out. Thus, in the absence of
any better data, the plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient.
Further, Dr. Allan Lichtman's calculations for the
plaintiffs, based in part on the defendants' citizenship
data estimates, reflected an Hispanic voting age
citizenship of 50% or more in all of the questioned
eleven districts. This is a more relevant calculation,
for the supermajority percentages are merely designed
to account for, inter alia, citizenship.
(5)(c) Equally important, it is unrefuted that
Hispanics have been able to elect the Hispanic
candidate of choice in every district in which
Hispanics constitute 59% or more of the voting age
population (without regard to citizenship). It is not
necessary to target anything greater than that. Nor is
it necessary, although it may be desirable, to create
a supermajority of 65% Hispanics (or 55% African
Americans) to accomplish Section 2's purposes.
Additionally, the growth trends in Dade County's
Hispanic population indicates that the percentage of
Hispanics will continue to increase, but the plaintiffs'
Section 2 claims have been evaluated only on the
basis of the 1990 census data. That data clearly
establishes that the eleven districts meet the Gingles
test.
(6) The remedial aspect of this court's adoption of
the modified De Grandy plan presented a major
challenge. In recognition of the respect due to the
state's own policy and plan for redistricting, this
court considered the defendants' two submitted plans,
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neither of which was even close to meeting Section
2's requirements and incorporating eleven Hispanic
districts in Dade County in accordance with this
court's findings on liability. At plaintiffs' suggestion,
this court then requested that the defendants draw a
plan that incorporated the De Grandy plan for Dade
County into the rest of the state. The defendants
refused, however, and the court recessed to consider
all of the alternatives available and make a decision.
Because of the severe time constraints and the
upcoming July 4th holiday weekend, it was critical
that a plan be adopted without further delay. It was
also apparent that the defendants were intent on
delaying the adoption of any plan that implemented a
true eleven-Hispanic districts House plan for Dade
County. Accordingly, this court adopted the
modified De Grandy plan. It does, of course, have
a *ripple effect," but that effect is relatively minor
and simply cannot be avoided. The defendants'
belated change of position and announcement that
they would attempt to draw a plan incorporating the
eleven Hispanic districts from the De Grandy plan
into the rest of the state came too late.
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ENDNOTES
1. Article 3, Section 16(a) of the Florida
Constitution provides that: Senatorial and
representative districts. The legislature at its regular
session in the second year following each decennial
census, by joint resolution, shall apportion the state
in accordance with the constitution of the state and of
the United States into not less than thirty nor more
than forty consecutively numbered senatorial districts
of either contiguous, overlapping or identical
territory, and into not less than eighty nor more than
one hundred twenty consecutively numbered
representative districts of either contiguous,
overlapping or identical territory. If the legislature
should fail at its regular session to apportion
themselves into the legislative districts as required by
Article 3, Section 16, the governor is required to
reconvene the legislature within thirty days in a
special apportionment session not to exceed thirty
consecutive days. Fla. Const. Art. 3 s 16(a).
During this time, no other business shall be
transacted and it shall be the mandatory duty of the
legislature to adopt a joint resolution. Fla. Const.
Art. 3 s 16(a). If the legislature adopts a
reapportionment plan, the constitution requires the
attorney general to petition the Florida Supreme
Court for a declaratory judgment determining the
validity of the apportionment. Fla. Const. Art. 3 s
16(c). The Supreme Court, in accordance with its
rules, shall permit adversary interests to present their
views and, within thirty days from the filing of the
petition, shall enter its judgment. If the Supreme
Court determines that the apportionment made by the
legislature is invalid, the governor shall reconvene
the legislature within five days thereafter in an
extraordinary apportionment session which shall not
exceed fifteen days, during which the legislature shall
adopt a joint resolution of apportionment conforming
to the judgment of the Supreme Court. Fla. Const.
Art. 3 s 16(d). If the Supreme Court determines that
the legislative apportionment is valid, the plan must
be precleared by the Department of Justice before it
may be considered validly enacted. Until the plan is
precleared, it may not be used in any election. The
Florida constitution is silent as to what occurs if the
Department of Justice fails to preclear a plan
previously validated by the Supreme Court. In its
order dated May 13, 1992, the Florida Supreme
Court explicitly "retainfed] exclusive state jurisdiction
to consider any and all future proceedings relating to
the validity of this apportionment plan." In re
Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G,
Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So.2d 276,
286 (Fla. 1992).
2. United States v. State of Florida, et al.,
TCA 92-40220-WS.
3. This lawsuit was not entirely unexpected, for
in its letter refusing to preclear the Florida Senate
plan, the Justice Department indicated its belief that
both the Senate and House plan contained Section 2
violations: Finally, we understand that there are
challenges under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
presently being considered in the consolidated cases
of De Grandy v. Wetherell, No. 92-40015-WS and
Florida State Conference of NAACP Branches v.
Chiles, No. 92-40131-WS (N.D.Fla.). In addition,
some of the comments we received alluded to various
concerns involving the adequacy of the plans in
non-covered counties. Because our review of these
plans is limited by law to the direct impact on
geographic areas covered by Section 5, we did not
undertake to assess the lawfulness of the legislative
choices outside of Collier, Hardee, Hendry,
Hillsborough and Monroe counties. We do note,
however, that allegations have been raised regarding
dilution of minority covered jurisdictions, for
example in the Pensacola-Escambia County area and
the Dade County area. Because these and other
legislative choices did not directly impact upon the
five covered counties, they cannot be the basis of
withholding preclearance of either plan. Exhibit 1 to
document 447 at 6. Because the Department's
"preclearance" jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
Florida's five covered counties, it could not reject
either the House or Senate plan on the basis that it
did not comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.
5. Reaves is a resident of Dade County.
6. The court specifically noted that its ruling
applied to all plaintiffs and not just the De Grandy
plaintiffs. Tr. VIII at 60.
7. The court specifically noted that its ruling
applied to all plaintiffs and not just the De Grandy
plaintiffs. Tr. VIII at 60.
8. There was testimony that because districts
containing a simple majority of African-American
VAP would elect an African-American candidate of
choice, districts containing 57 or 58 percent
African-American VAP are designed to waste
African-American votes and are, therefore, "packed."
Tr. VI-135-36.
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9. Javier Souto had repeatedly been reelected in
district containing 59% Hispanic VAP. Tr. II-153.
10. The fourth proposed Hispanic district in the De
Grandy plan contained 55% Hispanic VAP. The De
Grandy plaintiffs seemed to agree that the
Reaves/Brown plan (where the fourth proposed
Hispanic district contained 62.1% Hispanic VAP)
would be more effective.
11. De Grove testified that 32% of the population
(Anglo, African- American and Hispanic combined)
in Dade County are not citizens. Tr. VII- 20-1.
Furthermore, he testified that in a hypothetical tract
containing a 100% Hispanic population, 55% of the
tract's population would be non- citizens. Tr.
VII-23.
12. Although it would be possible to estimate the
citizenship levels on a tract by tract basis, the smaller
sample size (district versus county) would present
statistical problems. Tr. VII-52.
13. In our order dated May 29, 1992, however, this
court found that a supermajority was necessary. The
congressional inquiry was different from the inquiry
in this Section 2 case because in the former, we were
merely "considering" Section 2 when formulating
districts, while here we are presented with a specific
challenge to the Florida plan.
14. Specifically, the 65 percent rule is premised on
the fact that many Hispanics are non-citizens and
have lower voter registration and turnouts. If this
were not the case, there would be no reason to create
districts containing more than 50.1 % Hispanic VAP.
No one disagrees that because of the lower
citizenship and registration/turnout rates, Hispanic
districts must contain a supermajority of Hispanic
VAP. As previously stated, the 65 percent rule was
"arbitrarily" created to account for these problems.
Thus, this court must either (1) accept or modify the
65 percent rule or (2) formulate its own methodology
for estimating the number of non-citizens reflected in
the Hispanic VAP for the various districts. Because
each of the districts contains a 60% Hispanic VAP
and, therefore, "satisfies" the 65 percent rule, the
court need not further inquire as to the Hispanic
citizenship levels in each proposed district.
15. In 1980, Miami Beach was 30 percent Hispanic.
In 1990, it is 49 percent Hispanic. Tr. 11-14.
16. The African-American population can also
support another majority district in Broward/Palm
Beach counties.
17. As the court in Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp.
196, 207 (E.D.Ark.1989), stated: [Slome of the
districts [proposed by the plaintiffs] look rather
strange, but we do not believe this is fatal to
plaintiffs' position. Their alternative districts are not
materially stranger in shape than at least some of the
districts contained in the present apportionment plan.
The one-person, one-vote rule inevitably requires that
county lines and natural barriers be crossed in some
instances, and that cities and other political and
geographic units be split in others.
18. According to Dr. Moreno, this number is
believed to be undercounted by 30,000.
19. It was unclear whether this data is not available
or if the appropriate analysis was not done. Tr.
11-112.
20. Mr. De Grandy is not testifying as an expert.
21. This is significant, for example, in the 36 district
where the non- Hispanic African American VAP is
49%, but the total African-American VAP is 52%.
Thus, there is approximately three percent Hispanic
African-American VAP in this district.
22. In fact, "[aIll the Hispanic ethnic groups by
nationality tend to be more conservative than their
counterparts in other large U.S. metropolitan areas."
Tr. 11-18.
23. Affidavit of Thomas B. Hoeffler, document 472
at 8.
24. African-American registration in Dade County
is 90 percent Democrat. Moreno Aff. at 19. "The
antipathy of Black voters to Republican candidates is
illustrated in recent presidential and state-wide races
[where] no GOP candidate received more than 12
percent of the Black vote." Id. African-Americans
also vote heavily for Democrats in state legislative
elections. Id.
25. Dr. Lichtman is a professor of history and
formerly Associate Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences at The American University in Washington,
D.C.
26. "In every election studied, Hispanics vote for
Hispanic candidates in greater proportion than either
whites or blacks. The results reported in Table I
show a pattern of strong political cohesion. By
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generally overwhelming majorities, Hispanic voters
preferred to elect Hispanic candidates to state
legislative positions. In 11 of 13 elections for the
Senate of House, ecological regression results show
that more than 75 percent of Hispanic voters opted
for the Hispanic candidates." Government Exhibit 46
at P 6.
27. In his live testimony, Dr. Moreno stated that
even fewer African- Americans crossed over (3.7%).
Tr. II-95.
28. Although blacks comprise only 29 percent of
the population of this district, they exert greater
influence because most of the Hispanics in this
district are not United States citizens. Thus,
African-Americans represent over one third of the
registered voters in this district.
29. Representative Burke felt that African-
Americans have suffered greater discrimination than
Hispanics. Tr. VII-126. Dr. Weber similarly
testified that "African-Americans have had greater
difficulty than Hispanic Americans" in achieving
political empowerment in South Florida. Tr. VI-
145. Likewise, Dr. Moreno testified that Blacks are
also the most disadvantaged of the three major ethnic
groups that live in the Greater Miami area. In all
social-economic indicators [, Afro-Americans are the
worst off of Dade [Clounty's citizens. ... Miami's
Black community facing discrimination, poverty, and
not participating in local decision-making has erupted
in violence four times during the 1980's. Moreno
Aff. at 11-12. Plaintiff Darryl Reaves testified that
there was discrimination against both Cubans and
African-Americans and could not state which group
has been most victimized. Tr. V-132.
30. These five counties are subject to the Section 5
preclearance requirement because they provided
election information only in the English language
when more than five percent of the voting age
citizens were Spanish-speaking, and fewer than fifty
percent of them were registered to vote or voted in
the 1972 Presidential Election. See 41 Fed.Reg.
34329 (August 13, 1976); 40 Fed.Reg. -
(September 23, 1975).
31. All plaintiffs and the defendants agreed that
voting is racially polarized in Escambia County, and
that the African-American population in Escambia
County is large, compact, and concentrated in the
Pensacola area. Additionally, the parties agreed that
Florida's House plan split the politically cohesive
community in Escambia County into several districts.
Thus, the parties agreed to a consent judgment which
formulated new House districts in the Escambia
County area uniting the African-American population
of the Pensacola area. (Doc. 548).
32. Plaintiff De Grandy, on the other hand,
submitted plan 275 which also contains four Hispanic
voting age population majority districts. In plan
275's majority Hispanic districts, Hispanics constitute
the following percentages of the voting age
population: (1) District 33-71.5%; (2) District
34--66.1 %; (3) District 35-55.0%; and (4) District
40--66.2 (Plan 275). District 35 in this plan falls
short of our 60 percent guideline and De Grandy's
own expert, Dr. Moreno, admitted that district 35
was "problematic" because its 55 percent VAP was
probably too low for Hispanics to be able to elect
candidates of their choice. Tr. 11-66. Additionally,
this district includes the South Beach area of Miami
which contains a large number of recent arrivals who
are noncitizens. Tr. IV- 158. This additional fact
makes this 55 percent district unacceptable and we
reject plan 275 as a viable option.
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Biggins Leaves ADEA Issues Unresolved
By JAMEs R. BEYER
Special to The National Law Journal
preme Court decided theONAPRIL 20, the U.S. Su-
case of Walter Biggins, an
employee who claimed
that all he wanted was a
"damn raise."' Whether Mr. Biggins
will get his raise is still in doubt But in
Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co.,' the high
court has made It more difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail in actions under
the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act.8
The court in Biggins found that an
employer's termination of an employ-
ee to avoid paying pension benefits to
the employee does not automatically
constitute age discrimination. If an
employee establishes a violation of the
ADEA, however, the employer will be
found to have willfully violated the
ADEA. Accordingly, it will be liable for
double the amount of actual damages
awarded to the employee for the ADEA
violation.'
The plaintiff in the case, Mr. Biggins,
started working for the Hazen Paper
Co. in 1977. He was 52 when he was
hired and had spent his entire career
as a chemist in the paper industry.
Hazen Paper manufactures coated,
foll-laminated and printed paper and
paperboard. The company is privately
owned and operated by two cousins,
Robert and Thomas Hazen.
While working at Hazen Paper, Mr.
Biggins developed a water-based pa-
per coating, referred to as "Biggins
Acrylic." It exceeded the requirements
of a federal law that called for compa-
nies to eliminate hazardous emissions
from paper coatings and resulted in a
superior product in terms of gloss and
durability.
Hazen Paper's sales increased sub-
stantially as a result of its use of Big-
gins Acrylic. In 1983, Mr. Biggins
learned of the sales increases and felt
they resulted from his development of
Biggins Acrylic. He sought a pay in-
crease, and the Hazens agreed to give
him a 10 percent raise.
Dissatisfied, Mr. Biggins sought an-
other increase in 1984, asking that his
pay go from $44,000 to $100,000. The
company refused, but Mr. Biggins
claimed that Thomas Hazen had
promised him stock in the company
equal to his salary demand. Thomas
Hazen "denied emphatically" that he
had promised to give Mr. Biggins any
stock.' Apparently, Mr. Biggins contin-
ued to work during the next two years
for $44,000 per year.
In 1986, the Hazens discovered that
Mr. Biggins, in a private business ven-
ture with his son, was cleaning up haz-
ardous wastes and recovering dirty
solvents produced by paper companies
and automobile repair shops. When
Thomas Hazen learned of this cleanup
business, he concluded that Mr. Big-
gins had taken personal advantage of
his employment at Hazen Paper and
that there was a great risk that Mr.
Biggins would disclose company se-
crets to competitors. The Hazens told
him his moonlighting activity was
"outrageous."*
Sometime in the spring of 1986, the
Hazens asked Mr. Biggins to sign a
confidentiality agreement that would
restrict his outside activities during
his employment with the company and
for a limited time thereafter. No other
Hazen Paper employee was subject to
a confidentiality agreement." Mr. Big-
gins said repeatedly that he would not
sign the agreement unless the Hazens
increased his salary to $100,000. Nego-
tiations on the agreement continued
for weeks without resolution.
Finally, on June 13, 1986, Thomas
Hazen told Mr. Biggins that he would
not receive a pay increase and that he
would be terminated unless he signed
the confidentiality agreement. Mr. Big-
gins refused and was terminated that
day. He latqr said. "[My termination]
wasn't a surprise, really, because I had
become a pain to the Hazens.""
At the time of his termination. Mr.
Biggins had worked for Hazen Paper
for more than 9% years. He would have
become vested in the company's pen-
sion plan and eligible for $93,000 in pen-
sion benefits after 10 years of employ-
ment.'
Mr. Biggins filed suit against the Ha-
zen Paper Co. in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts. He
alleged that in terminating his em-
ployment, the company had violated
the ADEA and ERISA, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act"
He also asserted state-law claims
contending wrongful discharge by the
company in order to deprive him of the
promised stock compensation, fraud
for the company's alleged failure to
give him stock, breach of contract
based on violation of procedu-es in the
company's employee handbook, and a
violation by the company of the Massa-
chusetts Civil Rights Act that inter-
fered with his rights under that act.
The case was tried before a jury in
July 1990. After a week of testimony,
the jury returned a verdict of slightly
more than $2 million for Mr. Biggins.
The jury found the company had vio-
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.ted the ADEA and had discriminated
-ainst Mr. Biggins because of his age.
assessed actual damages at $560,775
ad doubled this amount because it
und the company's violation of the
atute to be willful. The jury also
und that Mr. Biggins had been dis-
barged to prevent him from vesting
1 his pension and awarded him
100,000 for this violation."
The defendants filed a motion pursu-
at to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules
f Civil Procedure for a judgment not-
Ithatanding the verdict or, In the al-
rative, for.a new trial. U.S. District
udge Frank H. Freedman called Mr.
iggins' case a "bit thin" and ex-
ressed "doubt about whether a pen-
ion-law violation Implies age discrim-
iation when eligibility for benefits is
*iggered by a certain amount of time
n the job, not age." The judge found
aat the violation of the ADEA was not
rillful and therefore reduced the
mount of the damages for the ADEA
iolation t $560,TI5."
ist U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-BOT SIDES appealed. to thepeals. The circuit court's de-
cision, Issued Jan. 8, 1992, by
.Jiidge Hugh H. Bownes,
found.that the jury'averdict was sup-
ported by the -evidence. The circuit
court stated:
[The:jury could have reasonably
foud '.that Thomas. Hazen decided.
to fire Biggins before his pension
rights vested and used -the confi-
dentiality agreement as a means to
that end. The jury could also have'
reasonably found that age was in-
extricably: intertwined with the de-
cision to ire Biggins. If it were not
for Biggina age, sixty-two, his pen-
sion rights ewould not have been
within a hairbreadth of vesting."-.
The court then addressed the issue of
whether Hazen Paper's violation of the
ADEA was willful.
In the 1985 case of Trans World Air-
lines v. Thuraton," the Supreme Court
adopted a standard of willfulness that
holds that an employer commits a
willful ADEA violation "if the employ
er either knew or showed reckless dia-
regard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."
Thurston, however,. Involved a for-
mal and publicized employment policy
rather than an ad hoc employment de-
cision." Several courts of appeals have
refused to apply Thurston to ad hoc
employment decisions, instead requir-
ing some greater burden to prove
"wilitulness.""
In Biggins, the lst Circuit Hated all
the circuits' applications of the wiliful-
ness standard to cases involving adhoc employment decisions," thereby
highlighting to the Supreme Court the
need for guidance on this issue. The 1st
Circuit held that it would continue to
apply the Thuraton willfulness stand-
ard to ADEA actions. The court stated:
"We realie that in many cases this
will result In a willful violation follow-
ing hard on the heels of an ADEA vio-
lation, but that is the nature of the
beast In a disparate treatment case, at
least until either the Congress or the
Supreme Court changes the definition
of willfulness.""
The circuit court then had no trouble
finding that Hazen Paper's violation of
the ADEA was willful. The court said:
"The principal owner of the company,
Thomas Hazen, testified that he was
'absolutely' aware that age discrimina-
tion was illegal. This Is as strongal.
dence of a knowing violation of ADEA
as a plaintiff could wish."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor au-
thored the Supreme Court's unanimous.
decision in Biggins. She began by stat-
ing that the court had granted certio-
rari to. decide two questions
First, does an employer's inter-
ference with the vesting of pension
benefits violate the ADEA? Second,
does the Thuraton standard for liq-
uidated damages apply to the case
where the predicate;'4DEA viola-
tion 'irnot 'a formal,14acially dis-
criminatory. policy, as In Thurston,
but rather ank Inforial 'deciaion by
the employer that was motivated
by the'employee's agv?"
The court answered .the' first ques-
tioby holdin nterference with
the ves of pensornbentits does not
automaticallycaonatituteage discrimi-
nation. It stated:
The courts of appeals-iepeatedly
have laced the question whether an
employer violates th 'ADEA by
acting .on the basis of ifactor, such
as an employee's pensionstatus or
seniority, thatis emprocany corre-
lated; with age Weno clarify
that there Is no linste treat-
ment under the EADEwhen the
factor motivating-qemployer is
some:faue te ta the em-
ployee's age. .When .he employ-
er's decision I i"rholly motivated
by factors other than age, the prob-
lem of inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes disappears. This is true
even ifthe motivatingafactor is cor-
related with age, as pension status
typically is. Because age:and years
of service are analytically distmcs,
an employer can take account of
one. while ignoring 'the' other, and I
thus it is incorrect -tosay that a




disparate treatment cla .cannot suc-
nceed iia agel P A a role
In that r , EzidkA& A(determina-
cide whether there was sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to find an ADEA
violation. It remanded the case to the
1st Circuit to make this determina-
tion.0
dessed the issu of te mea-.HE SUPREME Court next ad-ing of the word "willful" In the
ADEA. The court remarked
that it already had stated the
meaning of the word in. Thuraton -
defning it as an employer's knowing
or reckless disregard for whether its
conduct was prohibited by the act.
The court then stated:
Surprisingly, the courts of ap-
peals continue to be confused about
the meaning of the term "willful"
In Sec. 7(b) of the ADEA. A number
of circuits have declined to apply
Thuraton to what might, be called.
an informal disparate treatment
case - where age has entered into
the employment decision on an ad
hoc, informal basis rather than
through a formal policy... The
chief concern of these circuits has
been that the application of Thur-
ston would defeat the two-tiered
system of liability intended by Con-
gress, because every employer that
engages In informal age discrimi-
nation knows or recklessly disre-
gards the illegality of its conduct
We believe that this' concern is
misplaced.- -
Justice O'Connor said that a two-
tiered system of liability still exists in
ADEA cases because an employer who
knowingly relies on age in reaching its
decision does not invariably commit a
knowing or reckless violation of the
ADEA. For example, she cited the stat-
utory defense that would allow an em-
ployer to bar individuals from employ-
ment because of their age if it is a bona
fide occupational qualification, such as
with the federal regulation concerning
the age of airline pilots. She also point-
ed out that there are certain exemp-
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tions from AL)IEA coverage, such as for
certain bona fide corporate executives
and highly placed policy-makers.
Justice O'Connor said the only. differ-
ence between Thuraton and Big as
was, that:Thuraton involved a "formal
and publicised policy" and Biggiss in-
volved an employment decision made
on "an ad hoc basis.". This distinction
was Insufficient to persuade the court.
to use a more stringent. standard to
find a willful ADEA violation., She
dontinued*
But surely an employer's reluc-
tance to acknowledge Its reliance
on the forbidden factor should not
cut against imposing a penalty. It
would be a wholly circular and self-
defeating interpretation of the
ADEA to hold that,:In cases where
an employer more likely knows its
conduct to be illegal, knowledge.
alone does not suffice for liquidated
damages. We therefore reaffirm
that the Thurston definition of...
"willful" ... applies to- all disparate
treatment cases under the ADEA.
Once a "willful" violation has been
shown, the employee need not addi-
tionally demonstrate that the em-
ployer's conduct was outrageous.
or provide direct evidence of the.
employer's motivation,, or prove
that age was the predominant rath-
er than a determinative factor in
the employment deciston,".
As a result of Biggins, plaintit -a--
tempting to establish age discrimina-
tion will have a more difflcult burdis
of an -
tors that are empr lly
with age .- such as pensian, ItIaAs
ry or seniority - will not auto
ly establish an-ADEA violation:PI
tiffs. clalxn age discrimination 11
have to come up withaolme other e-
dence to 0stablish that theiage had a
determinative influence on the em-
ployer's decision. Normally, however,
plaintiffs are not able to obtain direct
evidence of discrimination, and they
often have little indirect evidence to
rely upon.
As mentioned above, the Biggine
case was sent back to the court of ap-
peals to reconsider whether there was
enough other evidence to establish an
ADEA violation. This is likely to cause
the lower courts to grapple with the
Issue of what evidence will be required
for ADEA liability without clear guid-
ance from the Supreme Court.
It is probable that employers will in-
creasingly move for summary judg-
ment in age discrimination cases, and
they may prevail more often. But if
plaintiffs' cases survive summary
judgment, employers need to face the
possibility that they could be required
to pay liquidated damages.
Mr. Biggins claimed his wish for the
Supreme Court's decision was that "we
win, I get the money [and] the whole
thing is finally over."" He didn't get his
wish, the whole thing is not over and
he may not get any money on his age-
discrimination claim. But if he does
succeed on his claim, he will surely get
liquidated damages. Regardless of
what happens, the case could end up
right back at the Supreme Court's
doorstep.
(1) Barrt. Waw One Maws Pght for a Rase
Became & Major Age-Blas Case." Wall St. J, Jan.
7, 1995, at L
(2) 188 UAS leala 2978 (April 20. 298).(3) The ADRA state. "it shaB be unlawful for
an employer.. to fall or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise disrimlate
against any Individual with respect to his com.
pensatlon terms, conditions, or privileges em-
playment. becanse of such Individual's age." 29
U.S.C. 623(&) (1).
(4) The ADEA provides '[tbst liquidated dam-
ages shall be payable only in cases of willful viola-
tians" of the act 29 UAC. 6(b). The ADEA
adopts the defInition of lquidated damage. estab
lIshed in the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C.
216(b), an amount equal to the peculary losses
suffered. by the. discharged employee by way of
lost wages, salary Increases and other benefIt.
(5) Biggins v. Hso Paper Co.. 98 F2d 1406,
14.1 (1st Cir. 19).
(6) Id. Mr. Biggins claimed be had received the
Haeons' permission to engage In the outside buat-
ness venture with his on. See Barrett. Wall St. J.,
Jan. ..1998.n
(7) The court of appeals did not sate whether
any other Hasmn Paper employees were engaged
in outside buinessa activitie. 953 F.2d at 1411.
(8) Barrett, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1993.
(9) 953 PF.2 at 1411-142.
(10) Sec. 510 of EIA prohibits interference
with pealon plan rightL.
(U). 93 F 1408.
(12)'U: at
(13) 963 F.1= .
(14) 489 U.S. 111 (2285).
(15) In Thurston', Tram World Airlines had a
policy under which pilots older than 60 could be*
come fight engineer but they had to go through
a ddag" procedure andfwetE not guaranteed a
fI lAfngineer. position. Federal aviation regula-
tions prohibit people older than 6o from remaining
as pilots. Conversely, pilots younger than 60 who
were disqualified from being pilots - because of
medical disability or jobeliminstion for example
- were not required. to resort to the bidding pro-
cedure. Accordingly, the policy was held to dis-
criminate against employees an the basis of their
age.(16) At least on circuit refuses to impose lqui-
dated damages in such a case unless the employ*
ers conduct was "outrageous." Lockhart v. West.
inghouse Credit Corp.. 879 F.2d 43. 57-88 (3d Cir.
1989). Another requires that the underlying evi-
deance of liability be direct rather than circum-
stantiaL Neufeld v. Searle Laboratories, 884 .2d
335, 340 (8th Cir. 1989). Still others have insisted
that age be the "predominant" rather than Simply
a determinative factor. Spulak v. Kmart Corp.. 84
F.2d 1250, 1189 (10th Cr. 1990); Schrand v. Ped.
Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 132, 188 (6th Cir. 1988).(17) 953 F.2d 1412-1415.
(18) Id. at.11.
(19) Id.
(20) 1998 U.S. Iaxss 2978 at 8.
(21) Id. at 8-14 (citations omitted).(22) Id. at 12. The Supreme Court defined the
difference between a disparate-treatment claim
and a disparate-impact claim. stating. 'Disparate
treatment is the most easily laidrstood type of
dIscrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others becanus of their
race, color, religion (or other protected character-
istics) Proof of discrImInatory motive Is critical.
although it can In some situations be interred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment
Claims that stress disparate impact' [by contrast)
involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business neces*
sity. Proof of discriminatory motive is not re-
quired under a disparate-Ampact theory." Id. at 9-
10. The court, however, refused to decide whether
a disparate-Impact theory of liability is available
under the ADEA.
(28) The court stated: "Beasides the evidence of
penaon Interference, the Court of Appeals cited
some additional [Indirect] evidentiary support for
ADEA liability....In the ordinary ADEA case, In-
direct evidence of this kind may well suffice to
support liability i the plaintit also ahows that the
employer's explanation for its decision.. .is 'un-
worthy of credence.' But inferring age-motivation
from the implausibility of the employers explana-
tion may be problematic in cases where other
unsavory motives, suach as penslon Interference,
were present. This Issue is now before us In the
Title Vu context (Hacks v. St. Mary's Honor Can-
tar, 970 P.d 487 (8th Cir. 1992). cart. granted. 113 .
CL 95 (193)) and we will not address It prema-
turely. We therefore, remand the case for the
Court of Appeal.." Id. at 17-2.
(2&) Id. at 202.
(25) 29 U.S.C. 421(c).
(26) 19 U.S ladis 2978 at 24.
(27) Barrett. Wall St. J., Jan. 7.1998.
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Over the past decade or more, it has become
customary for civil rights lawyers to hold their
collective breath every June at the end of the U.S.
Supreme Court's term in anticipation of decisions that
will erode anti-discrimination laws.
Alas, this term has turned out no differently. On
June 25, the court issued a ruling that significantly
increases the burden of workers to prove unlawful
job bias in cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and it is an opinion that has the
anomalous result of allowing employers to get away
with lying in anti-discrimination litigation. (Of
course, the court has yet to rule that workers may lie;
that possibility is about as real as summertime snow
in Rio Grande City.)
Since 1973, the law regarding proving a Title VII
violation has evolved into a three-stage process.
First, the employee must show that discrimination
was at least a likely reason for dismissal or failure to
win a job or promotion (that is, a qualified minority
person or woman is passed over in favor of a
non-minority individual or a male.)
In stage two, the employer then has the burden of
producing evidence of a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the action. In the third
and final step, the employee must show that the
employer's reason is not credible, but a pretext for
unlawful discrimination.
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing in June for the
five-justice majority in St. Mary's Hope Center v.
Hicks, No. 92-602, addressed the third stage in a
case in which a qualified African-American prison
supervisor had been dismissed. Melvin Hicks had
made it through stage one in his suit and, in stage
two, had shown that the reasons proffered by the
state of Missouri (disciplinary infractions) were
pretextual (the prison administration disregarded
similar or more serious infractions by white
supervisors). The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that Hicks was entitled to prevail without
further proof of what the prison officials' real,
undisclosed reasons might have been.
The 8th Circuit opinion was consistent with the
solid body of law that Title VII litigation had
developed in recognition of the fact that employees
rarely possess direct evidence of an employer's intent
to discriminate. Indeed, no halfway intelligent
employer will leave a paper trail to that effect or
make similar utterances. Thus, the rule of
presumptive pretextual discrimination had come into
effect.
Under the new rule announced by Justice Scalia,
an aggrieved employee now will have to prove that
the real reason for losing a job or promotion was
actual discrimination, even when the employer offers
false justifications for the actions.
Thus, the court continued its trend of rendering
anti-discrimination law nearly impossible for
plaintiffs, without overruling the law outright. Four
years ago, the justices made disparate impact cases
(detrimental effect on women and minority workers)
virtually impossible to win: Congress since has
overturned those decisions for the most part with the
Civil Rights Restoration Act.
In St. Mary's Hope Center, Justice Clarence
Thomas joined Scalia, as he usually does, to provide
the majority. Thomas is a former head of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; if anyone
should understand the problem of employees proving
illegal discrimination, he should. But apparently he
does not, being more content in his role as "border
watchdog," as sociologists call it, for majoritarian
interests.
Dissenting Justice David Souter, often described as
a recluse in the New England woods, had a more
realistic appraisal of the world: "[Common] sense
tells us that it is more likely than not that the
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employer who lies is simply trying to cover up the discrimination in our society. In that way, we can
illegality alleged by the plaintiff." become the fair and just people our state's founders
intended and that our citizens time and again have
Congress again should act to repair this damage to indicated through constitutional amendment and
20 years of "stable law," as Souter wrote, that results statutory enactment they want to be.
in a decision "unfair to plaintiffs, unworkable in
practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who
present false evidence in court."
TEXAS TO THE RESCUE
In the meantime, Texas law may provide its own
relief, more protective than that contemplated by the
Scalia majority.
Gov. Ann Richards has signed into law an
anti-discrimination statute that creates the state's own
body of equal employment law. The new statute,
effective Sept. 1, takes federal laws as a model and
incorporates them into a separate and distinct cause of
action in state court, along with entitlement to
equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages,
court costs and attorneys' fees. Essentially, the new
Texas law creates state employment statutes parallel
to Title VII, the federal Civil Rights Restoration Act
and Title I of the federal Americans with Disability
Act. The new Texas law, which amends and expands
the Commission on Human Rights Act, is clearly one
of the most comprehensive anti-discrimination
employment statutes in the nation.
Not only does the new Texas law mean that
workers can litigate in state court without the fear of
removal to less-than-friendly federal courts, but in
Texas case law it is clearly settled that state judges
apply precedent in effect when the comparable law
was enacted, despite its subsequent construction by
courts of other jurisdictions.
Thus, Texas judges are not bound in any fashion,
even as a matter of persuasive precedent, by St.
Mary's Hope Center. They are free to effectuate the
broad purposes of the Commission on Human Rights
Act, continuing to rely on the traditional three-prong
test that federal courts had used until June 25.
Texas has a less-than-honorable history in
employment discrimination. With the passage of the
state's 1972 Equal Rights Amendment banning
discrimination on account of race, sex, color, creed
or national origin, and passage of the new
anti-discrimination employment law adding a
prohibition on discrimination against workers with
disabilities, we should insist that Texas courts
develop the legal tools needed to root out
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EXPANDED CIVIL RIGHTS COVERAGE URGED
BIAS: REVERSING A BUSH ADMINISTRATION POSITION,
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ASKS THE SUPREME COURT TO APPLY
A 1991 LAW TO CASES PENDING BEFORE PASSAGE.
By DAVID G. SAVAGE, TIMES STAFF WRITER
Copyright 1993 The Times Mirror Company
Los Angeles Times
May 1, 1993
The Justice Department, reversing a position adopted by the George Bush Administration, urged the Supreme
Court on Friday to apply the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to the thousands ofjob discrimination cases that "We have reexamined our position and have
were pending when the measure became law. concluded that it is incorrect," the Justice Department
said in its brief to the high court.
That issue will be resolved by the justices in two
cases to be heard in October.
If the high court were to adopt the Clinton
Administration's view, employers could have to pay
costly damage claims for discrimination that occurred
years ago. Job discrimination suits often take five
years or more to come to trial, which means cases
that began in the early 1980s could still be pending
on appeal.
The 1991 law reversed a series of Supreme Court
rulings that had made it harder for employees to
prove they had suffered discrimination. It also, for
the first time, permitted victims of sex discrimination
to win damages from employers.
The measure became law on Nov. 21, 1991, after
a prolonged and bitter fight between congressional
Democrats and the Bush White House. Bush vetoed
two versions of the bill, contending that they would
force employers to hire by quotas to avoid lawsuits.
A few days after the Senate narrowly confirmed
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, Bush
announced that he would sign the pending civil rights
bill that became law.
The legislation did not spell out whether the law
should apply retroactively, but then-White House
counsel C. Boyden Gray drafted a statement for Bush
insisting that its provisions - such as the damage
remedies for women - would apply only to cases that
arose after that date.
Lawyers for the Justice Department and the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had
adhered to that position until it was reversed last
week by the Clinton White House.
The Supreme Court itself has been confused over
the years on whether new laws apply retroactively to
pending cases. In a 1964 school case, the court said
that judges should apply the law as it exists when a
case reaches them, even if it was different when the
case first arose.
But in a 1988 case involving reimbursements for
hospitals, the court said retroactivity is not favored in
the law unless Congress clearly says that new
provisions should apply to old cases still pending.
Not surprisingly, lower courts have been divided
recently on whether the 1991 law should apply
retroactively. Most have taken the view that the new
law does not cover cases that arose before 1991, but
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in California
has taken the opposite view and applied the law
retroactively.
That split finally forced the high court to announce
that it would resolve the issue.
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92-757 LANDGRAF v. USI FILM PRODUCTS
Sexual harassment-Application of 1991 Civil
Rights Act to cases pending at time of enactment
Ruling below (CA 5, 968 F2d 427, 59 FEP
Cases 897):
Although employee suffered sexual harassment
sufficiently severe to support hostile environment
sex discrimination claim under Title VII of 1964
Civil Rights Act, district court's findings that she
voluntarily left her employment because of her
other conflicts and unpleasant relasiomhipt with
co-workers and that level of sexual harassment
was insufficient to support finding of constructive
discharge were not clearly erroneous, and thus
she was not entitled to any relief; jury trial and
compensatory and punitive damages provisions of
Section 102 of 1991 Civil Rights Act do not
apply retroactively to conduct occurring before
effective date of act, given lack of clear congres-
sional intent on issue and manifest injustice that
would result from upsetting case that was proper-
ly tried by court under procedures applicable at
time or from charging employer with anticipating
seachange in employer liability effected by com-
pensatory and punitive damages provisions.
Question presented: Does 1991 Civil Rights
Act apply to cases pending when act became law,
so as to entitle petitioner to full redress provided
in Section 102 of act, when both lower courts
found that she was victim of unlawful sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII, but was not
entitled to any relief whatsoever?
Petition for certiorari filed 10/28/92, by Paul
C. Saunders, and Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
both of New York, N.Y., Timothy B. Garrigan,
and Stuckey & Garrigan, both of Nacogdoches,
Texas, and Richard T. Seymour, Michael Selmi,
and Sharon R. Vinick, all of Washington, D.C.
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BARBARA LANDGRAF v. USI FILM PRODUCTS
No. 91-4485
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
968 F.2d 427; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17414; 59 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 897; 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P41,662
July 30, 1992, Decided
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Barbara Landgraf brought suit against her
employer asserting sexual harassment and retaliation
claims under Title VII. After a bench trial, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the
defendants. Although the district court found that
sexual harassment had occurred, it concluded that
Landgraf had not been constructively discharged and
therefore was not entitled to any relief under Title
VII. Landgraf asserts on appeal that the district court
clearly erred in finding that she was not
constructively discharged and that the district court
erred in failing to make factual findings on her
retaliation claim. She also argues that she is entitled
to nominal damages even if she is unable to
demonstrate a constructive discharge. Finally, she
asserts that the damage and jury trial provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied
retroactively to her case. We affirm the district
court's judgment in all respects and find that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to this case.
I.
Landgraf worked for USI Film Products in its
Tyler, Texas production plant on the 11:00 p.m. to
7:00 a.m. shift. From September 1984 to January
1986, she was employed as a materials handler
operating a machine which produced several thousand
plastic bags per shift. While she worked at the plant,
fellow employee John Williams subjected her to what
the district court described as "continuous and
repeated inappropriate verbal comments and physical
contact." The district court found that this sexual
harassment was severe enough to make USI a
"hostile work environment" for purposes of Title VII
liability. The harassment was made more difficult for
Landgraf because Williams was a union steward and
was responsible for repairing and maintaining the
machine Landgraf used in her work.
Landgraf told her supervisor, Bobby Martin, about
Williams' harassment on several occasions but Martin
took no action to prevent the harassment from
continuing. Only when Landgraf reported the
harassment to USI's personnel manager, Sam
Forsgard, was Williams' behavior investigated. By
interviewing the other female employees at the plant,
the investigation found that four women corroborated
Landgraf's reports of Williams engaging in
inappropriate touching and three women reported
verbal harassment.
Williams denied the charges, contending that "they
are all lying." Williams was given a written
reprimand for his behavior, but was not suspended,
although the written policies of USI list sexual
harassment as an action "requiring suspension or
dismissal." He was technically transferred to another
department, however, USI officials conceded that he
would still be in Landgraf's work area on a regular
basis. This transfer was not a form of discipline
against Williams; as soon as Landgraf resigned he
was transferred back to the original department.
The investigation dealt not only with Williams'
behavior but also involved questioning employees
about their relationship with Landgraf. On January
13, 1986, Forsgard, Wilson, and Martin met with
Landgraf. According to Wilson's notes describing the
meeting, Forsgard first told Landgraf that her claim
had been investigated and that USI had taken the
action it deemed appropriate. The meeting then
turned to focus on Landgraf's problems in getting
along with her co-workers. She was told that she was
very unpopular and was "among [her] own worst
enemies." When Landgraf asked whether anything
was going to happen to Williams she was told that
USI had taken what it considered appropriate action
and to notify them if Williams attempted to take
revenge.
After working just two more shifts, Landgraf left
her job at USI. She left a letter addressed to her
colleagues stating that "the stress that each one of you
help [sic] to put on me, caused me to leave my job."
The letter did not refer to the sexual harassment or to
Williams by name. Approximately two days later,
Landgraf spoke to her supervisor about her decision
to resign and specifically attributed it to the
harassment by Williams.
II.
It is uncontested that Barbara Landgraf suffered
significant sexual harassment at the hands of John
Williams during her employment with USI. This
harassment was sufficiently severe to support a
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hostile work environment claim under Title VII.
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986). She
reported this harassment to her employer through
supervisor Bobby Martin on several occasions and no
corrective action was timely taken.
Because Landgraf voluntarily left her employment
at USI, however, she must demonstrate that she was
constructively discharged in order to recover back
pay as damages. In order to demonstrate constructive
discharge, she must prove that "working conditions
would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a
reasonable person in the employee's shoes would
have felt compelled to resign." Bourque v. Powell
Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.
1980); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390-91 (5th
Cir. 1990). The district court found that the sexual
harassment by Williams was not severe enough that
a reasonable person would have felt compelled to
resign. This conclusion was strengthened by the
district court's finding that at the time Landgraf
resigned USI was taking action reasonably calculated
to alleviate the harassment. The district court further
found that "as evidenced by the language in her
resignation letter, Landgraf's motivation for quitting
her employment with USI was the conflicts and
unpleasant relationships she had with her
co-workers."
Landgraf argues first that the district court clearly
erred in finding that USI had taken steps reasonably
calculated to end the harassment. We disagree. Our
review of the district court's factual finding is
limited. As the Supreme Court has recently described
the scope of our review: "If the district court's
account of the evidence is plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals
may not reverse it even though convinced that had it
been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently." Anderson v.
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 84 L. Ed. 2d
518 , 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985). There was evidence
that USI had given Williams its most serious form of
reprimand and acted to reduce his contact with
Landgraf at the workplace. Landgraf testified that
Williams continued to harass her after his reprimand,
however, she did not report these incidents to USI
before resigning. Title VII does not require that an
employer use the most serious sanction available to
punish an offender, particularly where, as here, this
was the first documented offense by an individual
employee. The district court did not clearly err in
concluding that USI took steps reasonably calculated
to end the harassment.
Landgraf argues that the finding of no constructive
discharge was clearly erroneous. We disagree. The
district court, after hearing all the testimony in this
case, concluded that Landgraf resigned for reasons
unrelated to sexual harassment. The evidence in this
case presented two possible reasons for Landgraf's
decision to resign: problems with her co-workers, as
evidenced by her note or sexual harassment as stated
in conversation with Bobby Martin. Landgraf testified
at trial that the sexual harassment was the reason for
her resignation. She also stated that the reference to
"the devil [who] has been your leader so far" in her
resignation note was actually a reference to Williams.
The district court concluded based upon this
testimony and the note itself that the problems with
her co-workers actually caused her resignation. Given
these two plausible interpretations of the evidence, we
must affirm the district court's finding. Landgraf also
asserts that the conflicts she had with her co-workers
were as a result of her problems with Williams.
There was conflicting evidence on this question and
the district court specifically found that Landgraf's
conflict with her co-workers was unrelated to the
sexual harassment by Williams. The district court did
not clearly err in finding that Landgraf left her
employment at USI for reasons unrelated to sexual
harassment.
Moreover, even if the reason for Landgraf's
departure was the harassment by Williams, the
district court found that, particularly in light of the
corrective actions taken by USI immediately before
Landgraf resigned, the level of harassment was
insufficient to support a finding of constructive
discharge. To prove constructive discharge, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or
pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum
required to prove a hostile working environment.
Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School
District, 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981)
(constructive discharge requires "aggravating
factors"). The harassment here, while substantial, did
not rise to the level of severity necessary for
constructive discharge. Although USI's investigation
of this incident may not have been overly sensitive to
Landgraf's state of mind, the company had taken
steps to alleviate the situation and told Landgraf to let
them know of any further problems. A reasonable
employee would not have felt compelled to resign
immediately following the institution of measures
which the district court found to be reasonably
calculated to stop the harassment. We cannot say that




Landgraf asserts that the district court erred in
failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law with regard to her retaliation claim against USI.
USI argues that no findings on the retaliation claim
are necessary because Landgraf failed to prevail on
her claim of constructive discharge. We agree.
An adverse negative employment action is a
required element of a retaliation claim. Collins v.
Baptist Memorial Geriatric Center, 937 F.2d 190,
193 (5th Cir. 1991). The only possible adverse
employment action that Landgraf suffered after she
complained to Martin about the sexual harassment
would be the alleged constructive discharge. Because
the district court found that the reason Landgraf
resigned her position was her trouble getting along
with her co-workers, she cannot prove constructive
discharge on the basis of retaliation. As noted above,
Landgraf asserts that her troubles with her
co-workers were as a result of her complaints about
Williams' harassment. However, the district court
explicitly found to the contrary and we cannot say
that that finding was clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
Landgraf's retaliation claim cannot prevail because
she suffered no adverse employment action as a result
of her complaints. Collins, 937 F.2d at 193.
IV.
Landgraf argues that even if she fails to
demonstrate that she was constructively discharged,
she may still be awarded nominal damages which
would carry with them an award of attorneys' fees.
We recognize that some confusion may have arisen
from our statement in Joshi v. Florida State Univ.,
646 F.2d 981, 991 n.3 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981),
indicating in dicta that in some cases an employee
who suffered from illegal discrimination but was
ineligible for back pay might be entitled to nominal
damages. Several circuit courts have explicitly held
that such nominal damages are available under Title
VII in some cases. Only the Seventh Circuit has
directly rejected the award of nominal damages as
relief in Title VII cases. Bohen v. City of East
Chicago, Indiana, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir.
1986).
We conclude that the Bohen court's rejection of
nominal damages as a Title VII remedy is the correct
interpretation of the statutory scheme.' Title VII
provides that where a court finds that an employer
has engaged in unlawful employment practices, it
may order action "which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay, .. .or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. @
2000e-5(g). We have consistently interpreted this
provision to mean that "only equitable relief is
available under Title VII." Bennett v. Corroon &
Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988).
Nominal damages such as those awarded in
Huddleston and Baker are legal, not equitable relief
and are therefore outside the scope of remedies
available under Title VII. Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1184
(damages unavailable to redress Title VII violations
that do not result in discharge).
Landgraf also asserts that she is entitled to
equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment,
relying on the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Bibbs v.
Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985). We conclude
that no declaratory judgment is appropriate in this
case. The purpose of equitable relief under Title VII
is "to restore the victim of discrimination to fruits
and status of employments as if there had been no
discrimination." Bennett, 845 F.2d at 106. Here,
because Landgraf voluntarily left her employment she
was not deprived of any fruits of employment as a
result of the sexual harassment. Her argument that
she is entitled to a declaratory judgment for purposes
of vindication because she prevailed on the issue of
whether sexual harassment occurred must also fail.
See Laboeuf v. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mass.
1980) (allowing declaratory judgment for purposes of
vindication). USI did not dispute at trial the fact of
Landgraf's sexual harassment. The only issues
disputed were the propriety of USI's reaction to the
harassment and Landgraf's reason for resigning.
Landgraf did not prevail on either of these issues and
the district court did not err in refusing to grant a
declaratory judgment.
V.
Finally, we address the question of whether any
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 apply to
this case. Two provisions of the Act would affect this
case if applicable: the addition of compensatory and
punitive damages and the availability of a jury trial.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, @
102(a)(1), 102(c), 105 Stat. 1072-73 (1991).
We recently addressed the issue of the Act's
retroactivity in Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.,
F.2d _ , 1992 WL 147678 (5th Cir. July 1, 1992),
where we joined the other circuit courts which have
ruled on the issue in holding that @ 101(2)(b) of the
Act does not apply to conduct occurring before the
effective date of the Act. See Luddington v. Indiana
Bell Telephone Co., _ F.2d _, 1992 WL 130393
(7th Cir. June 15, 1992); Fray v. Omaha World
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Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v.
City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992). We
need not repeat here our discussion of the legislative
history of the Act. For the reasons explained in
Johnson, we conclude that there is no clear
congressional intent on the general issue of the Act's
application to pending cases. We must therefore turn
to the legal principles applicable to statutes where
Congress has remained silent on their retroactivity.
As we noted in Johnson the legal principles
surrounding the retroactive application of statutes are
somewhat uncertain in light of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416
U.S. 696, 40 L. Ed. 2d 476 , 94 S. Ct. 2006 (1974)
and Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488
U.S. 204, 109 S. Ct. 468, 102 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1988).'
We need not resolve the recognized tension between
the Bradley and Bowen cases, however, in ordert to
resolve the issue facing us here. See Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S.
827, 837, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1572, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842
(1990). Even under the standard set forth in Bradley
we conclude that these two provisions of the Act
should not be applied retroactively to this case.
The rule set forth in Bradley is that a court must
"apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
[**15] In determining whether retroactive
application of a statute will wreak injustice, we
consider "(a) the nature and identity of the parties,
(b) the nature of their rights, and (c) the nature of the
impact of the change in law upon those rights."
Belser v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
F.2d (5th Cir. July 9, 1992), citing Bradley, 416
U.S. at 717, 94 S. Ct. at 2019.
We turn first to the provision allowing either party
to request a jury trial. When this case was tried in
February 1991, the district court applied the law in
effect at that time when it conducted a bench trial on
the Title VII claims. We are not persuaded that
Congress intended to upset cases which were properly
tried under the law at the time of trial. See Bennett v.
New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 105 S. Ct. 1555, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 572 (1985) (Court would not presume that
Congress intended new grant regulations to govern
review of prior grants). To require USI to retry this
case because of a statutory change enacted after the
trial was completed would be an injustice and a waste
of judicial resources. We apply procedural rules to
pending cases, but we do not invalidate procedures
followed before the new rule was adopted. Belser,
F.2d at
We now turn to whether the Act's provisions for
compensatory and punitive damages apply to pending
cases. We conclude that they do not. Retroactive
application of this provision to conduct occurring
before the Act would result in a manifest injustice.
The addition of compensatory and punitive damages
to the remedies available to a prevailing Title VII
plaintiff does not change the scope of the statute's
coverage. That does not mean, however, that these
are inconsequential changes in the Act. As Judge
Posner notes in Luddington, "such changes can have
as profound an impact on behavior outside the
courtroom as avowedly substantive changes." Unlike
allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys'
fees as in Bradley, the amended damage provisions of
the Act are a seachange in employer liability for Title
VII violations. For large employers, the total of
compensatory and punitive damage which they are
potentially liable can reach $ 300,000 per claim.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, @ 102(3)(b)(3).
The measure of manifest injustice under Bradley is
not controlled by formal labels of substantive or
remedial changes. Instead, we focus on the practical
effects the amendments have upon the settled
expectations of the parties. There is a practical point
at which a dramatic change in the remedial
consequences of a rule works change in the normative
reach of the rule itself. It would be an injustice
within the meaning of Bradley to charge individual
employers with anticipating this change in damages
available under Title VII. Unlike Bradley, where the
statutory change provided only an additional basis for
relief already available, compensatory and punitive
damages impose "an additional or unforeseeable
obligation" contrary to the well-settled law before the
amendments. 416 U.S. at 721. We conclude that the
damage provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 do
not apply to conduct occurring before its effective
date.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENDNOTES
1. We note, of course that under the amendments to
Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, remedies
will no longer be limited to equitable relief.
However, for the reasons discussed below, those
amendments do not apply to this case.
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92-938 RIVERS v. ROADWAY EXPRESS INC.
Race-Discharge-1991 Civil Rights Act-
Retreactivity.
Ruling below (Harvis v. Roadway Express
Inc., CA 6, 973 F2d 490):
1991 Civil Rights Act does not apply retroac-
tively to claims pending at time it was enacted;
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
57 LW 4705 (1989), which held that right to
make contracts protected by 42 USC 1981 does
not apply to conditions of employment but covers
only discrimination in formation of employment
contract or right to enforce contract, was properly
applied retroactively to Section 1981 claims that
were untried and pending on date it was decided.
Question presented: Does 1991 Civil Rights
Act apply to cases that were pending when act
was passed?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/2/92, by
Charles Stephen Ralston, Julius L. Chambers,
and Eric Schnapper, all of New York, N.Y., Ellis
Boal, of Detroit, Mich., and Cornelia T. L. Pil-
lard, of Washington, D.C.
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RIVERS v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.
No. 91-3348
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
973 F.2d 490; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19436; 61 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 91; 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P41,699
May 4, 1992, Argued
August 24, 1992, Decided
August 24, 1992, Filed
BOGGS, Circuit Judge.
In this race discrimination case, the appellants
originally claimed they were discharged because of
racial discrimination and now state that the claim was
also for retaliatory discharge for winning a grievance,
exercised for racial reasons. The claim was dismissed
by the district court based upon the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct.
2363 (1989). On appeal, appellants argue that the
district court misapplied Patterson, but that even if
their claim had been properly dismissed, this court
should reinstate their claim by retroactively applying
to this case the new Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA
of 1991), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100,
42 U.S.C. @ 1981, which explicitly enacted the
interpretation of @ 1981 rejected in Patterson. We
reverse on the grounds that the district court
misapplied Patterson to dismiss appellants' retaliatory
discharge claim. We affirm the district court's
dismissal of the race discrimination in firing claim,
and hold that the CRA of 1991 should be not applied
retroactively to this case.
I
Plaintiffs-appellants Maurice Rivers and Robert C.
Davison are Black garage mechanics who were
employed by defendant Roadway Express, Inc. since
1972 and 1973 respectively. On the morning of
August 22, 1986, Roadway verbally informed Rivers
and Davison that they were required to attended
disciplinary hearings that same day related to their
accumulated work record. Both plaintiffs refused to
attend, alleging inadequate notice. Roadway was
contractually required to provide prior written notice
of such hearings and allegedly routinely did so for
white employees. The hearings resulted in two-day
suspensions for both appellants. Appellants filed
grievances with the Toledo Local Joint Grievance
Committee (TLJGC), which granted the grievances
based on "improprieties" and awarded each appellant
two days of back pay.
Shortly after these initial hearings, disciplinary
hearings were again called by Roadway's Labor
Relations Manager, James O'Neil, who announced
that he would hold disciplinary hearings against
Rivers and Davison within seventy-two hours. Rivers
and Davison again refused to attend, claiming
inadequate notice. As the result of the hearings, both
Rivers and Davison were discharged on September
26, 1986, for refusing several direct orders to attend
the hearings and for their accumulated work record.
In February 1987, Rivers and Davison, along with
James T. Harvis, filed this suit, alleging that
Roadway discriminated against them on the basis of
race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. @ 1981 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. @ 2000e.
They also alleged that Roadway violated the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29
U.S.C. @ 185(a), and brought an unfair
representation claim against their union. Both of these
latter claims were dismissed on summary judgment
by the district court.
The district court then separated Harvis's case,
which went to trial and ended in a jury verdict on the
@ 1981 claim for Roadway. The district court
ordered judgment against Harvis on his @ 1981 and
Title VII claims. Harvis's appeal to this court was
denied and the trial court'sjudgment affirmed. Harvis
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.
1991).
On June 15, 1989, shortly after Harvis's verdict
and before appellants went to trial, the Supreme
Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132
(1989), which held that the right to make contracts
protected by @ 1981 does not apply to conditions of
employment, but only covers discrimination in the
formation of the employment contract or the right to
enforce the contract. The district court, while holding
that Patterson was not retroactive with respect to
Harvis's jury verdict, held it did have retroactive
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effect on the untried and pending @ 1981 claims of
Rivers and Davison. The district court concluded that
appellants' claims were for discriminatory discharge
and thus, based on Patterson, could not be maintained
under @ 1981. Rivers and Davison argued that their
claims were not simply for discriminatory discharge,
but rather for retaliation for their success in enforcing
contract rights in a grievance hearing. However, the
district court held that these were only basic breach
of contract claims, and not claims based on the right
to enforce contracts, which would fall under @ 1981.
After dismissing the @ 1981 claims, the district court
held a bench trial on plaintiffs' Title VII claims and
ruled in favor of Roadway, holding that Rivers and
Davison failed to establish that their discharge from
employment was based upon their race.
Rivers and Davison appeal the district court's
dismissal of their @ 1981 claims on two grounds.
First, they argue that Patterson does not preclude this
action, as it is not an action for discriminatory
discharge, but rather an action based on retaliation
for attempting to enforce the labor agreement, thus
[**6] squarely falling under @ 1981. Second, while
this appeal was pending, the CRA of 1991 was
enacted, explicitly contradicting the Patterson
decision. Appellants argue that the CRA of 1991
should be applied retroactively to their @ 1981
claims, thus invalidating the district court's decision.
The case, they argue, should be remanded for a new
determination under this new legislation.
II
42 U.S.C. @ 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
The Patterson court limited the scope of @ 1981
actions by holding that @ 1981 does not apply to
discrimination in conditions of employment, but only
prohibits discrimination in the formation of the
employment contract or the right to enforce the
contract. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176. Thus, under
Patterson, @ 1981 "covers only conduct at the initial
formation of the contract and conduct which impairs
the right to enforce contract obligations through legal
process." Id. at 179.
While Patterson did not directly address the issue
of whether @ 1981 applied to discriminatory
discharges, this court, along with a majority of other
courts, has held that claims of discriminatory
discharge are no longer cognizable under @ 1981
because discharge does not involve contract
formation. See Prather v. Dayton Power & Light
Co., 918 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
115 L. Ed. 2d 1054, 111 S. Ct. 2889 (1991); Hull v.
Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505 (6th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2917, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 1080 (1991). The plaintiffs, below and on
appeal, argue that theirs were not discriminatory
discharge claims, but rather, claims of retaliatory
discharge where plaintiffs were punished for
attempting to enforce their contract rights to be
treated equally with white people. The district court
rejected this claim as "bootstrapping" and held that
this was solely a discriminatory discharge case.
Before deciding whether or not Patterson was
correctly applied, we must first address whether the
district court was correct in retroactively applying
Patterson to the claims of Rivers and Davison. Our
circuit has twice held that Patterson does apply
retroactively to pending cases. In Prather v. Dayton
Power & Light Co., supra, we applied Patterson
retroactively to a pending discriminatory discharge
case based on three factors used to determine whether
an exception mandating non-retroactivity exists, as
discussed by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296, 92 S. Ct.
349 (1971). Under these factors, a decision will not
be applied retroactively if, first, it establishes a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past
precedent on which litigants have relied . . . or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution
was not clearly foreshadowed.
Id. at 106 (citations omitted). The second
retroactivity factor is the "prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation." Id. at 106-07. Finally, the [**9] third
factor involves weighing "the inequity imposed by
retroactive application" to avoid "injustice or
hardship." Id. at 107.
Weighing these factors, the Prather court held that
applying Patterson retroactively would not "retard its
operation," nor would it produce "substantial
inequitable results" that might otherwise be avoided
and concluded that applying Patterson would not
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unduly prejudice the plaintiff. Prather, 918 F.2d at
1258. This decision was reaffirmed in Hull v.
Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., supra. The district
court correctly found that Patterson applied
retroactively to the pending @ 1981 claims of Rivers
and Davison.
Appellants argue that, even if Patterson is applied
retroactively to their case, their claims still survive
Patterson and the district court wrongly dismissed the
claim as a discriminatory discharge complaint not
recognized under @ 1981. We agree.
Appellants contend that Patterson only eliminates
those claims of retaliation for exercising rights that
are unrelated to the specific @ 1981 right to "make
and enforce contracts." But, they argue, Patterson
does not eliminate a cause of action for exercising
rights that do relate to the enforcement of contract
rights. Appellants maintain that they are not making
discriminatory discharge claims, but rather are
claiming retaliatory discharge that punished them for
enforcing their contract right to receive notice equal
to that received by whites.
Roadway counters that Rivers and Davison were
not punished for enforcing their contract rights as
the right to enforce contracts does not however
extend beyond conduct by an employer which impairs
an employee's ability to enforce through legal process
his or her established contract rights.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177-78.
However, the prohibited conduct of impairing the
ability to enforce contract rights is exactly what
appellants are complaining about here. Rivers and
Davison were punished, they contend, for trying to
utilize the established legal process for their
grievances. The fact that Roadway allowed formal
"access" to legal process does not imply that it could
never be impairing the employee's "ability to enforce
through legal process." An employer's intimidation
and punishment conducted inside formal legal process
may impair an employee's contract rights just as
much as intimidation and punishment conducted
outside formal legal process. See Carter v. South
Central Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1079, 111 S. Ct. 2916
(1991) (court emphasized that the alleged conduct
must have impaired the plaintiffs ability to enforce
contractual rights either through court or otherwise
on the basis of race).
Appellants' claims are similar to those in Von
Zuckerstein v. Argonne National Lab., 760 F. Supp.
1310, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1991), where plaintiffs were
permitted to proceed to trial on their @ 1981 claims
that "defendants specifically retaliated against them
for pursuing (or intending to pursue) their contract
claims in the internal grievance forum." Id. at 1318
(emphasis in original). We do not agree with
appellee's argument that Von Zuckerstein is
distinguishable because it involved an employer who
impaired or impeded the plaintiffs from using the
available legal process to enforce a specific anti-
discrimination contract right. However, @ 1981
speaks of the right to "enforce contracts," which
includes any contract rights, not just anti-
discrimination contract rights. The key here is that
plaintiffs were impaired from enforcing contract
rights, not the kind of contract right they were
impaired from enforcing. Just because Rivers and
Davison were allowed to use the available legal
process does not mean the employer did not
discriminate against them through retaliation for the
very act of using that legal process. Retaliation is
defined more broadly than mere access to legal
process. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908
F.2d 104, 111 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 L.
Ed. 2d 241, 111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991), held that
retaliation "is a common method of deterrence." We
hold that appellants have articulated this essential
element of @ 1981, that their ability to enforce
claimed contract rights was impaired because of their
race.
Roadway argues that even if retaliatory discharge
did occur, the plaintiffs never alleged retaliatory
discharge in either their first or amended complaints.
However, upon examination of the record, we find
that sufficient allegations exist to form the basis of a
retaliatory discharge claim. While appellants admit
that their pre-Patterson complaint was not specifically
structured as a "right to enforce a contract" claim as
opposed to a "condition of employment" claim, the
very basis of their complaint has always stemmed
from retaliatory discharge. They allege, in their
amended complaint, that "Rivers' [sic] and Davison's
discharges were taken without just cause. More
particularly Roadway scheduled a hearing for them
for September 26, 1986, based on conduct for which
a grievance committee had previously exonerated
them with backpay." We find that the appellants'
claims fall within the Patterson definition of
permissible @ 1981 actions, as the claims involve
discrimination in the right to enforce a contract. We
hold that the district court wrongly dismissed
appellants' @ 1981 claims and the case should be
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remanded for further proceedings on the @ 1981
claims.
IV
Our holding that the case should be remanded for
further proceedings on appellants' @ 1981 claims
raises potential collateral-estoppel problems. The
district court has already had a bench trial on the
appellants' Title VII claims, finding that Rivers and
Davison were not discharged from employment based
on their race.
A similar situation existed in Lytle v. Household
Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 108 L. Ed. 2d 504, 110
S. Ct. 1331 (1990), where Lytle, a Black machinist
for a subsidiary of Household Manufacturing, was
dismissed for unexcused absences. Lytle filed a
complaint with the EEOC, alleging that he had been
treated differently than white employees who missed
work. He then brought discriminatory discharge and
retaliation claims under @ 1981 and Title VII. The
district court dismissed Lytle's @ 1981 claims,
concluding that Title VII provided the exclusive
remedy for his racial discharge and retaliation claims.
At a bench trial on the Title VII claims, the district
court dismissed Lytle's discriminatory discharge
claims pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and
granted defendants summary judgment on the
retaliation claim.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district
court's findings with respect to Title VII claims
collaterally estopped Lytle from litigating his @ 1981
claims because the elements of a cause of action
under @ 1981 are identical to those under Title VII.
Lytle, 494 U.S. at 549; see also Washington v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 756 F. Supp
1547, 1555 (M.D. Ga. 1991). The Supreme Court
reversed, based on plaintiff's seventh amendment
right to trial by jury in "suits at common law," noting
that:
When legal and equitable claims are joined in the
same action, "the right to jury trial on the legal
claim, including all issues common to both claims,
remains intact."
Lytle, 494 U.S. at 550 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court distinguished the Lytle
situation, where the equitable and legal claims were
brought together, from the situation in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 58 L. Ed. 2d
552, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979), where the Supreme Court
held that "an equitable determination can have
collateral-estoppel effect in subsequent legal action
and that this estoppel does not violate the Seventh
Amendment." Lytle, 494 U.S. at 550-51 (citing
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 335) (emphasis
added).
We find that our situation falls squarely under the
Lytle precedent and hold that collateral estoppel does
not preclude relitigation of issues decided by the
district court in its bench trial resolution of the
equitable claims of Rivers and Davison under Title
VII. As in Lytle, the purposes served by collateral
estoppel do not justify applying the doctrine in this
case. Id. at 553. Collateral estoppel is designed to
protect parties from multiple lawsuits and potentially
inconsistent decisions, as well as to conserve judicial
resources. Ibid. Although remanding for further
proceedings certainly will expend greater judicial
resources, such litigation is essential in preserving
Rivers's and Davison's seventh amendment rights to
a jury trial.
V
While this case was pending on appeal, the United
States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Appellants now argue that the district court should
also be reversed in light of the 1991 Act, which
amends @ 1981 to change the result in Patterson.
The 1991 Act states that:
For purposes of this section, the term "make
and enforce contracts" includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination
of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
the contractual relationship.
Pub. L. 102-166, @ 101(b); 42 U.S.C. @
1981(b).
Both this Circuit and the Eighth Circuit have
addressed whether this act should apply retroactively
to @ 1981 claims that were pending on appeal at the
time of enactment. Both circuits have ruled that the
CRA of 1991 does not apply retroactively. Fray v.
Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.
1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594
(6th Cir. 1992); Mozee v. American Commercial
Marine Service Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992).
Both Vogel and Fray examine the history of
judicial treatment of retroactivity as applied to new
legislation. Building upon both Roman civil law and
English common law, up to 1969 it was a
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well-established principle in American jurisprudence
that legislation must be applied only prospectively
unless the legislature specifically decreed a
retroactive application. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1374.
However, in Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham,
393 U.S. 268, 21 L. Ed. 2d 474, 89 S. Ct. 518
(1969), and in Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416
U.S. 696, 40 L. Ed. 2d 476, 94 S. Ct. 2006 (1974),
the Supreme Court held that a new statute must be
retroactively applied to a case that was pending on
appeal at enactment "unless doing so would result in
manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or
legislative history to the contrary." Bradley, 416 U.S.
at 711.
Later, in Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 102 L. Ed. 2d 493, 109 S.
Ct. 468 (1988), the Supreme Court reiterated the
principle that "retroactivity is not favored in the law.
Thus, congressional enactments and administrative
rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires the result." Id. at 208.
While the Supreme Court acknowledged this tension
in the case law in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 108 L. Ed. 2d
842, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990), the court did not have
to resolve the issue, as congressional intent was
found to be clear in that case.
Given these conflicting rules of construction, both
the Vogel and Fray courts examined the language and
legislative history of the CRA of 1991 and concluded
that it should not be applied retroactively. For
example, @ 402 of Pub. L. 102-166 states that
"except as otherwise provided, this Act and the
Amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon
enactment." While appellants argue that this indicates
retroactivity, the Vogel court correctly noted that this
language could mean that the Act applies to pending
cases or it could mean it should be applied only to
conduct occurring as of that date of enactment.
Vogel, 959 F.2d at 597-98.
Both the Vogel and Fray courts also agree that the
legislative history sheds little light on the matter, as
Senators expressed conflicting views and no
legislative committee reports exist explaining the bill.
Fray, 960 F.2d at 1376-77. Appellants argue that
retroactivity is implied because two sections are
expressly made prospective. However, the Fray court
notes that a bill that specifically changes the result in
Patterson retroactively was vetoed by the
President in 1990 and Congress failed to override the
veto. The court concluded that:
We think a rather clear picture emerges from this
review of the Act and its legislative history.
Proponents of retroactively overruling Patterson
commanded a majority in both houses of Congress,
but they could not override the President's veto of a
1990 bill that contained express retroactive
provisions. Thus, proponents could do no better than
send an ambiguous law to the judiciary. On the other
hand, opponents of retroactivity who favored
enactment of a prospective law (including the
President) were also willing to hand this controversial
issue to the judiciary by passing a law that contained
no general resolution of the retroactivity issue.
However, when a congressional majority could be
marshalled, retroactivity opponents "hedged their
bets" by expressly making specific provisions, such
as @ 109, prospective only.
Fray, 960 F.2d at 1377.
Given the ambiguous legislative history and
language of the act, this court held in Vogel that
Bradley should be read narrowly and should not be
applied in contexts where "substantive rights and
liabilities", broadly construed, would be affected.
Clearly, retroactive application of the 1991 Act would
affect "substantive rights and liabilities" of the parties
to this action.
Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598, citing United States v.
Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1991).
Appellants argue that Vogel is not determinative
here since it deals with @ 108, which is written
differently from @ 101, the section at issue here.
They also argue that the Fray opinion, which does
deal specifically with @ 101, is wrong. However,
appellants' arguments are not well taken on either
count. Their distinction between @ 101 and @ 108 is
immaterial, as both Fray and Vogel examined the
retroactivity of the 1991 CRA as a whole, not in
terms of specific sections, and both courts concluded
that applying the Act retroactively would adversely
affect substantive rights and liabilities.
We agree with the Fray and Vogel decisions and
hold that the 1991 CRA does not apply retroactively.
However, as we also find that the district court
misapplied Patterson, the case can be reversed on
those substantive grounds alone. We REVERSE and
REMAND for further proceedings under @ 1981, as
we hold that Patterson does not exclude @ 1981
claims based on retaliation for attempting to enforce
contract rights.
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DISSENT: SILER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion in full, except
that which is listed in part III. It is my opinion that
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), does not
permit a claim for retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
@ 1981 under the facts of this case. It may be that
Patterson precludes any retaliatory claims under @
1981, but this court need not go that far.
First, I have much more of a problem than the
majority in determining whether the plaintiffs ever
alleged retaliatory discharge in either their first or
amended complaints. However, for purposes of this
analysis, I will assume that they did.
The majority relies upon the decisions in McKnight
v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 113 L. Ed. 2d 241, 111 S. Ct.
1306 (1991); and Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l
Lab., 760 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1991). However,
McKnight did not hold that @ 1981 allows a claim
for retaliation. Instead, it assumed that it was so
actionable "provided that the retaliation had a racial
motivation." McKnight, 908 F.2d at 111. Then, the
court went on to find that the plaintiff in that case
"might be guilty of violating section 1981." Id. at
112 (emphasis added). It further stated that the
question need not be pursued, "because General
Motors did not interfere with contractual
entitlements." Id.
Moreover, the court in Von Zuckerstein held at
1319 that the plaintiffs in that case would have to
establish "that they sought to use the internal
grievance procedure to vindicate their contractual
right to be free from discrimination." That is unlike
the present case, which apparently does not have an
antidiscrimination provision in the collective
bargaining agreement.
Instead, I would follow the decision in Carter v.
South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1079, 111 S. Ct. 2916
(1991), which held that @ 1981 no longer extends to
retaliatory termination. Although that case is
somewhat different from this one, in that the plaintiff
asserted that he was retaliated against because of
filing a charge with the EEOC, which was a statutory
right, not a contractual right, nevertheless, the court
stated:
Were we to hold that section 1981 still
encompasses retaliatory discharge, we would be
encouraging litigation to determine what the
employer's subjective motive was when he fired the
employee: was it to retaliate or "merely" to
discriminate? This would be pointless. Both motives
are equally invidious, and the employee suffers the
same harm. Because section 1981 no longer covers
retaliatory termination, all suits for discriminatory
dismissal must be brought under Title VII.
Id. at 840-841. Accord Overby v. Chevron USA,
Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 472-473 (9th Cir. 1989), cited
with approval in Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint
Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505,
509 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2917, 115 L.
Ed. 2d 1080 (1991), for the proposition that
retaliatory discharge claim is conduct not cognizable
under @ 1981.
Moreover, this court has, by unpublished
decisions, followed that rule from Carter. Although
they have no precedential value, see Sixth Cir. R.
24(c), they were cited by Roadway Express in its
brief. I am not inclined to completely ignore opinions
of other judges on this court, even if they are not
binding. In Christian v. Beacon Journal Publishing
Co., No. 89-3822, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12080
(6th Cir. July 17, 1990) (unreported), the court held
that claims of retaliatory discharge may not be
brought pursuant to @ 1981 under Patterson, citing
Singleton v. Kellogg Co., No. 89-1073, 890 F.2d
417, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 17920 (6th Cir. Nov.
29, 1989) (per curiam) (unreported). See also
Bohanan v. United Parcel Serv., No. 90-3155, 1990
U.S. App. LEXIS 20154 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1990)
(unreported) (Wellford, J., concurring). Therefore, I
would affirm the district court in all respects.
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WILL THE peremptory challenge remain an
available tool in picking a jury?
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Batson
v. Kentucky' that the use of the peremptory
challenge in criminal trials to exclude jurors on the
basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Batson thus ushered in
a new era in the use and effectiveness of the
peremptory challenge.
Under Batson, a defense lawyer need no longer
show a pattern of discriminatory jury challenges,
over a range of cases, in order to object to the use of
a peremptory challenge. It is now sufficient to show
that the prosecution has used its challenges, in that
case alone, in a facially discriminatory way.
The Supreme Court has since extended Batson in
a variety of new directions. And just last May, the
court granted review in a case raising the question
whether Batson should be extended still further, to
cover challenges based on gender.'
Even in its original context, the principle adopted
in Batson raised as many questions as it answered,
and it certainly made the process of picking a jury a
more complex and sensitive exercise. The extension
of that principle, however, and the prospect of still
additional extensions in the future, greatly complicate
the picture. At the end of the day, there may be little
left of the peremptory challenge as we know it.
Before ' Batson'
Over a century ago, in Strauder v. West Virginia,
the Supreme Court held that a state may not
constitutionally prosecute a black defendant before a
jury from which all members of his race had been
excluded by statute. In 1965, the court returned to
the issue in Swain v. Alabama," expressly in the
context of peremptory challenges.
In Swain, the prosecutor had, through the use of
peremptory challenges, stricken all six black
members of the jury venire. The Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiff's claim of a denial of equal
protection, holding that "the record in this case is not
sufficient to demonstrate that the rule has been
violated by the peremptory system."5
The court explained that the experience of one case
was insufficient to show systematic discrimination.
Rather, the court stated, a defendant must point to the
exclusion of qualified black jurors "in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and
whoever the defendant or the victim may be .. . with
the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries.
"6
Under Swain, a constitutional challenge required a
showing of repeated exclusion of one race, by the
same prosecutor, over a period of time. Naturally,
this standard was difficult to meet, and by -1986,
when Batson reached the Supreme Court,. nearly
every attempt to satisfy the requirements of Swain
had failed.7
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson
dramatically recast the law of peremptory challenges.
In Batson, using his peremptory challenges, the
prosecutor struck all four black jurors from the panel.
The all-white jury thereafter convicted the black
defendant of second-degree burglary and receipt of
stolen goods.
The Supreme Court held that "[purposeful] racial
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a
defendant's right to equal protection because it denies
him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to
secure."' The court explained that individuals on a
venire "must be 'indifferently chosen' to secure the
defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
'protection of life and liberty against race or color
prejudice.'" '
The court also recognized that the harm of racial
discrimination affects not only the accused but the
potential juror as well because by "denying a person
participation in jury service on account of his race,
the State unconstitutionally [discriminates] against the
excluded juror. " 0 Indeed, the court noted, the
"harm from discriminatory jury selection extends
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beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the
excluded juror to touch the entire community. "
The Batson court went on to describe the
procedural showing that must be made to show
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge.
To establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination, the court stated, the defendant, as a
member of a cognizable racial group, must be able to
raise an inference that the prosecution used its
peremptory challenges to exclude from the venire
potential jurors of the defendant's race, and that it did
so on the basis of race.
Once the prima facie case has been made, the
burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a neutral
explanation for challenging those jurors. The
prosecution may not satisfy that burden simply by
advancing a blanket affirmation of good faith or by
relying on the stereotypical assumption that jurors
of a particular race will more likely favor a defendant
of the same race. 2
'Batson' Progeny
Since 1986, the Supreme Court has revisited the
principle in Batson and several times expanded its
contours.
In 1991, for example, in Powers v. Ohio," the
court clarified the constitutional right at stake when
Larry Joe Powers, a white man accused under Ohio
law of two counts of aggravated murder and one
count of attempted aggravated murder, challenged the
exclusion of black jurors from his panel under the
Batson rationale. The Supreme Court held that
under the Equal Protection Clause, a criminal
defendant may object to race-based exclusions of
jurors obtained through peremptory challenges,
whether or not the defendant and the jurors are
members of the same race.
Also in 1991, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.," the Supreme Court extended the rule in
Batson to private litigants in civil cases. In both
Powers and Edmonson, the court emphasized that,
separate and apart from the rights of the litigants
themselves, a race-based peremptory challenge
"violates the equal protection rights of those excluded
from jury service."
Just last year, in Georgia v. McCollum" the
Supreme Court expanded the Batson rationale again,
holding that the Constitution prohibits a criminal
defendant, as well as a prosecutor, from engaging in
purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in
exercising peremptory challenges."
Beyond Race
The Supreme Court has not yet considered a
Batson claim outside the ambit of race."' Read
broadly, however, Batson could well encompass
gender claims, as well as claims involving other
traditionally protected groups.
The Batson court explained that "[in] view of the
heterogenous population of our Nation, public respect
for our criminal justice system and the rule of law
will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race.""
The same, broad rationale might well support
extending Batson to peremptory challenges based on
any protected characteristic.
Although the Batson court viewed the purposeful
striking of jurors on the basis of race as plainly
harmful and wrong, it may be just as harmful and
wrong to exercise peremptory challenges for other
reasons, such as gender, age, disability, religion or
sexual orientation.
Next term, the Supreme Court will have its first
opportunity to explore these implications of Batson.
On May 17, 1993, the court granted certiorari in
J.E.B. v. T.B. to address the question whether
Batson applies to gender-based peremptory
challenges.
In J.E.B., a civil paternity action, Alabama, acting
on behalf of the mother, struck makes from the
prospective jury. The alleged father challenged the
state's strikes, contending that the principle in
Batson forbids such gender-based decisions. The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals disagreed, holding
that Batson does not apply to gender-motivated
challenges.
How the justices come out in the case depends, of
course, on where they come in.
To the extent that the right in Batson is broadly
conceived as, for example, the right of potential
jurors to equal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no apparent stopping point.
The Equal Protection Clause, after all, is broadly
framed. It provides that no "person" shall be denied
"the equal protection of the laws." Under this
interpretation of the clause, even opticians are entitled




Read for all it is worth, then, the rule in Batson
cuts a wide swath, entitling all "persons" to be free
of irrational discrimination in the process by which
they are selected as jurors.
But peremptory challenges are, by their very
nature, irrational. They are often no more than a
barely informed hunch or instinct, and stereotypical
thinking is almost inevitably involved. A peremptory
challenge, the Supreme Court noted in Swain, "is
often exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon
the bare looks and gestures of another.'"21
And as Justice, now Chief Justice, William H.
Rehnquist stated in his dissent in Batson, "[the] use
of group affiliations, such as age, race, or
occupation, as a 'proxy' for potentialjuror partiality,
based on the assumption or belief that members of
one group are more likely to favor defendants who
belong to the same group, has long been accepted as
a legitimate basis for the ... exercise of peremptory
challenges. "'
In short, the Batson rule, unless cabined on
somewhat artificial grounds, runs headlong into the
very concept of peremptory challenges. The
Supreme Court's decision next term may well decide
which right will give way first: the right articulated
in Batson, or the statutory right, enshrined in years of
practice, to exercise peremptory challenges.
Practical Impact
Batson has a powerful impact on practitioners
selecting a jury. Under Batson, the trial lawyer
should consider the following issues, among others,
in making or attacking a peremptory challenge.
* What level or scrutiny applies? If the Supreme
Court extends the Batson rule beyond the realm of
the race-based challenge, litigants may be faced with
disparate burdens of proof, depending upon the
nature of the underlying classification. As Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger explained in his dissent in
Batson.
[Under] conventional equal protection principles
some uses of peremptories would be reviewed under
"strict scrutiny and . . . sustained only if . . .
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest,"
. . . others would be reviewed to determine if they
were "substantially related to a sufficiently important
government interest," . . . and still others would be
reviewed to determine whether they were "a rational
means to serve a legitimate end."'
It is not clear how these varying standards might
apply in practice.
Moreover, the traditional view of peremptories as,
by their nature, "an arbitrary and capricious
right,"' suggests that no defense might be good
enough under any standard requiring a modicum of
rationality.
* When to make a Batson challenge? Although
technically a Batson challenge may be made as soon
as the first facially discriminatory challenge has been
made, as a matter of proof, it may be difficult to
assign discriminatory intent on the basis of a pattern
of one. Therefore, it is usually advisable to wait
until a sufficient number of strikes have been made to
constitute a more convincing pattern of
discrimination.
This problem of proof, however, is at odds with
language in some of the post-Batson decisions, which
suggests that the right at stake belongs to the
individual prospective jurors. Under that view, it
seems anomalous, to say the least, that an
individual's rights are not violated until there is a
pattern of violations involving other similarly situated
individuals.
* Whether to made the challenge at all? Making
this kind of challenge should always be a conscious
and deliberate decision, because an objection based
on Batson is, by its nature, a highly charged motion,
automatically and irretrievably inserting the issue of
race bias into the proceedings and implicitly accusing
the opposing attorney of bigotry.
* What are the remedies for a violation? In the
event that a Batson challenge succeeds, there remains
the question of the appropriate remedy.' Does the
court start over again with a new jury panel or
simply seat the wrongfully challenged jurors? If the
latter option is chosen, should the court seat all of the
struck jurors who are members of the protected
category, or simply the particular juror whose
rejection precipitated the Batson motion? These and
other practical questions remain unresolved.
Read broadly, Batson and its progeny are at odds
with the continued vitality of the peremptory
challenge. It may be difficult to articulate a
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principled basis for restricting the rule in Batson
simply to race cases, and it is therefore unclear
whether there is any logical stopping point to the
doctrine. Although Batson itself went some distance
toward dismantling the traditional peremptory
challenge, the questions now facing the Supreme
Court may tell us whether there will be any such
challenge left at all.
Lawrence S. Robbins is a partner in the Washington,
D.C. office of Mayer, Brown & Platt, where he
specializes in trial and appellate practice. Dorann E.
Banks is an associate at the firm.
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92-1239 J.E.B. v. T.B.
Paternity action-State's use of peremptory
strikes to exclude all males from jury.
Ruling below (Ala CtCivApp, 606 So2d 156):
In light of controlling Alabama Supreme Court
precedent, principle of Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986), forbidding racially motivated
peremptory jury strikes, will not be extended to
forbid gender-based strikes in civil action to es-
tablish paternity and recover child support.
Question presented: Does male defendant in
paternity action brought by state have right,
under Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, to challenge state's use of its peremptory
jury strikes to exclude all males from jury?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/21/93, by John
F. Porter III, and Livingston, Porter & Paulk
P.C., both of Scottsboro, Ala.
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WRIGHT, Retired Appellate Judge
The State of Alabama, on behalf of T.B.
(mother), filed a complaint for paternity and child
support against J.E.B. (father) in the District Court
of Jackson County. After a hearing the district court
entered an order adjudicating paternity and ordered
the father to pay child support. The father filed notice
of appeal to the circuit court. A jury trial was held.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the mother.
The trial court entered an order accordingly. The
father appeals.
Initially the father asserts that the trial court erred
in overruling the father's objection to the State's
peremptory jury strikes based on his allegation that
the State's strikes were based entirely on gender.
The father insists that the State improperly used its
peremptory strikes to purposefully eliminate men
from the jury. He suggests that such actions were in
violation of his rights to equal protection and due
process. He requests that this court extend the Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), principle, which
prohibits peremptory strikes based solely upon race,
to include gender-based strikes.
This issue has previously been addressed by the
court of criminal appeals and the supreme court.
Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027 (Ala. Crim. App.),
cert. denied 587 So. 2d 1039 (Ala. 1991); Daniels v.
State, 581 So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert.
denied 581 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 1991); Dysart v. State,
581 So. 2d 541 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied
581 So. 2d 545 (Ala. 1991). The supreme court
recently revisited the issue in Ex parte Murphy, [Ms.
March 20, 19921 596 So.2d 45 (Ala. 1992), and
declined to extend the Batson principle to
gender-based strikes. We must follow the decisions of
the supreme court. @ 12-3-16, Code 1975.
The father next contends that the blood test results
should have been excluded because the State failed to
establish a proper chain of custody. He specifically
asserts that the phlebotomist's failure to testify was
fatal to the admissibility of the blood test results.
Dr. Leigh Ann Harman, the supervisor of the
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Immunogenetics/DNA Diagnostic Laboratory,
testified that along with the blood samples she
received an Immunogenetics/DNA Diagnostic
Laboratory Paternity Chain of Custody Document.
The document was developed in order to allow the
supervisor to confirm the chain of custody without
having to bring numerous laboratory personnel to
court. Dr. Harman thoroughly discussed the
document and its safety devices. She testified in detail
as to her laboratory's procedures for drawing blood
samples and assuring proper identification of both the
individuals having the test and the blood samples
drawn from those individuals. She testified that once
the blood samples were received by the laboratory
they were checked for any sign of tampering. She
stated that there was no sign of tampering, that the
box was taped, the tape was intact, and the tape was
initialed by the person who sealed and delivered it.
We find that a proper chain of custody was
sufficiently established by Dr. Harman's testimony.
Lyle v. Eddy, 481 So. 2d 395 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985).
The father asserts that the trial court erred in
allowing into evidence the results of the DNA test
without first establishing that the test "met the
requirements of the recent supreme court holding in
the case of Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala.
1991)."
Ex parte Perry pertains to the admissibility of
DNA test results in a forensic setting. That case
clearly distinguishes between forensic testing and
clinical testing (which we have in this case). The
strict admissibility requirements of Ex parte Perry
are not applicable in a paternity action.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The foregoing opinion was prepared by Retired
Appellate Judge L. Charles Wright while serving on
active duty status as a judge of this court under the
provisions of @ 12-18-10(e), Code 1975, and this
opinion is hereby adopted as that of the court.
AFFIRMED.
All the judges concur.
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91-1523 FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT FOUR v. CARTER
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act-
State reimbursement of parents who place their
learning disabled child in private school that does
not meet state standards.
Ruling below (CA 4, 950 F2d 156, 60 LW
2400):
Parents who place child with learning disability
in private school that is not approved by state are
entitled to reimbursement of education expenses
under Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act; district court did not clearly err in conclud-
ing that public school system's individualized
education program for such child, which had goal
of four months' progress over period of more than
one year, failed to satisfy IDEA's requirement of
more than minimal or trivial progress.
Question presented: Are learning disabled
child's parents entitled to state reimbursement
under IDEA, when they unilaterally place her in
private school that does not meet state education-
al standards or in other respects satisfy criteria of
"free appropriate public education," which state
is required under 20 USC 1401(a)(18) and
1412(1) to provide as condition of receiving fed-
eral funding under act?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/23/92, by Donald
B. Ayer, Beth Heifetz, David A. Yalof, and
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, all of Washington,
D.C., and Bruce E. Davis, of Camden, S.C.
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Civil Rights
92-833 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER
Actionability of malicious prosecution claim under
42 USC 1983.
Ruling below (CA 7, 975 F2d 343):
Malicious prosecution unaccompanied by in-
carceration or other deprivation of liberty or
property is not actionable as constitutional wrong
under 42 USC 1983; harms from malicious pros-
ecution that was dismissed prior to trial are like
those from defamation, which, under Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), are not actionable
under Section 1983; facts that Section 1983
plaintiff chose to post non-refundable sum in lieu
of bail and was required to obtain permission
from court prior to leaving state during pendency
of prosecution are not sufficient to make out
claim of constitutional tort.
Question presented: Does baseless prosecution,
initiated and pursued without objectively reason-
able belief in existence of probable cause to
suspect accused of criminal wrongdoing, infringe
liberty protected by Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and thereby permit action
pursuant to Section 1983 even in absence of
incarceration or other accompanying loss or alter-
ation of "protected status" such as that recog-
nized in Paul v. Davis?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/12/92, by John
H. Bisbee, of Macomb, Ill.
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